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The	Clean	Power	Plan:		
Issues	to	Watch	
Introduction	
With federal climate legislation no longer politically viable, the Obama Administration has abandoned 
efforts to achieve legislation tailored to address the problem, and instead turned to its existing authority 
under the Clean Air Act (CAA). Although an imperfect tool for the purpose, the law does allow the 
Administration — the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to be specific — to make important 
progress reducing carbon pollution from power plants. That regulatory effort has proceeded along two 
tracks, one that seeks lower emissions from new or rebuilt power plants, and one that seeks to reduce 
emissions from existing power plants. 
That second track — existing power plants — is known as the Clean Power Plan, and it is the subject of 
this paper from the Center for Progressive Reform (CPR). The paper compiles 13 separately authored 
essays from 11 CPR Member Scholars, each addressing a different topic related to the Clean Power Plan, 
and each representing the expertise and views of its individual author(s).  
Power plants are the single largest stationary source contributor to greenhouse gases (GHGs). Electrical 
generating units (EGUs) emit 32 percent of the nation’s GHG emissions, exceeding industry’s 20-percent 
contribution. EPA’s Clean Power Plan for addressing existing power plants could have a dramatic impact 
on the nation’s energy mix, its GHG emissions, and on accompanying co-pollutants.  
In the Plan, EPA addresses power plant emissions through § 111 of the CAA. In September, 2013, EPA 
proposed its current approach to new power plants under § 111(b).1 In June 2014, EPA then issued the 
Clean Power Plan, the agency’s proposal for addressing existing power plants under CAA § 111(d)2.  
As implemented by EPA, § 111(d) establishes shared federal and state authority — cooperative 
federalism, as it is known. Under this structure, EPA must first establish federal emission guidelines for 
source categories based upon the “best system of emission reduction … adequately demonstrated” 
(BSER) for reducing power plant emissions. It is then the states’ task to develop state implementation 
plans (SIPs) for meeting the federal guidelines — for showing how their existing sources will attain the 
federal standard. If states fail to submit an adequate SIP, EPA has the authority to promulgate a Federal 
Implementation Plan (FIP). In addition to finalizing its rule for existing sources, EPA will publish a 
proposed FIP in the summer of 2015.  
EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan presents the federal government’s emission guidelines for existing 
power plants. The Plan has sparked heated legal and policy debates because it takes a novel approach to 
establishing emission guidelines. The plan has defined BSER to include a range of activities that can 
reduce existing power plant emissions. These include not only “inside the fence” measures undertaken at 
the source, but also such “beyond the fenceline” measures that take place outside of power plants but 
reduce power plant emissions, such as increased use of existing natural gas, renewable energy, and 
consumer energy efficiency that reduces the demand for energy. By expanding the range of permissible 
reduction strategies, EPA has significantly increased the plan’s scope. Not coincidentally, this allows the 
Plan to make a much more significant dent in greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective way. 
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Marshalling CPR Member Scholars’ wide-ranging expertise on relevant legal and policy questions posed 
by EPA’s Clean Power Plan, this policy paper identifies a number of the key issues that CPR Member 
Scholars are closely watching as EPA finalizes its rule and proposes a FIP. The paper explains the issues 
and how the proposed CPP addressed them. The authors offer their unique perspectives on what to watch 
for in the final rule this summer and what states should do to achieve the most from EPA’s ambitious 
Clean Power Plan.  
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Executive	Summary	
Laying the groundwork for the discrete analyses to follow, the paper begins with a short section sketching 
basic information about CAA § 111(d) and EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan. From there, it is divided 
into three major sections. The second section addresses a number of likely policy and legal challenges to 
the CPP, including whether states should participate, the constitutionality of the CPP, the legal and policy 
issues associated with EPA’s adoption of a systemwide approach rather than one that seeks emissions 
reductions only from activities that take place “inside the fenceline,” and a primer on the administrative 
law principles likely to shape the courts’ review of the final CPP rule.  
The third section addresses the CPP’s implications for the energy sector, considering its impact on the 
energy industry, its impact on reliability, implications for transitioning to a clean energy economy, and 
the opportunities and challenges for multi-state regional compliance given the interconnected energy grid.  
The fourth section addresses several discrete implementation issues, including the legal and policy issues 
raised by compliance through cap-and-trade, a close look at the federal-state relationship under § 111(d) 
and its implications for the stringency of state targets, the use of mass-based versus rate-based state 
targets, and the CPP’s indirect implications for environmental justice, an issue that arises through the 
CPP’s important impacts both on GHGs and on traditional pollutants. 
Confronting	the	Challenges	to	the	CPP	
Should States Participate? CPR Member Scholar and EPA expert Thomas O. McGarity responds to 
Senator Mitch McConnell’s call for states to simply boycott the state implementation planning process. 
He observes that boycotting states might be shooting themselves in the foot. States that fail to engage in 
their own planning would become subject to an EPA-written Federal Implementation Plan that is likely to 
be more inflexible and offer fewer low-cost compliance mechanisms than the flexible state-controlled 
planning process envisioned under the Clean Power Plan.  
Constitutionality: As soon as the CPP is released, critics will launch their legal attacks. Environmental 
and constitutional law scholars William W. Buzbee and Robert L. Glicksman respond to numerous 
constitutional attacks already lodged against the CPP, many of them spearheaded by constitutional law 
scholar Lawrence Tribe as counsel for the coal industry. Buzbee and Glicksman argue that the CPP does 
not tread on any constitutionally suspect ground, addressing: 
 Nondelegation doctrine: The authors maintain that CPP opponents’ nondelegation claim — that 
Congress’ lack of clarity gave the agency too much power — is a makeweight with no support under 
existing precedent. 
 Takings doctrine: The “takings claim” — that the plan’s economic impacts unconstitutionally “take” 
power plants’ property — is similarly far-fetched in light of existing precedent. 
 Federalism: Buzbee and Glicksman carefully explore the heart of the constitutional claims: that the 
CPP, by indirectly addressing critical energy policy choices, is improperly treading on state’s rights in 
violation of the 10th Amendment, which preserves states’ rights. They demonstrate that the CPP’s 
cooperative federalism structure, which leaves many critical decisions to the states, is typical of many 
environmental statutes and fully consistent with settled federalism principles and the constitution. 
 “Unconstitutional” commandeering of state authority: In response to the claim that potential 
sanctions for failure to comply with the CAA, like the loss of highway funds, unconstitutionally 
coerce states to comply, Buzbee and Glicksman demonstrate that the states retain viable options and 
that the CAA’s financial incentives do not unconstitutionally commandeer the states. 
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EPA’s Systemwide Approach: Glicksman and Buzbee tackle another central cross-cutting controversy: the 
CPP’s systemwide approach, which considers emission-reducing measures that require activities beyond 
the fenceline. It is widely anticipated that EPA will retain its systemwide approach when it issues the final 
rule, encouraging states to achieve power plant emission reductions by such means as energy 
conservation, increased efficiency, and renewable energy alternatives. Glicksman and Buzbee argue that a 
systemwide approach is both wise as a matter of policy and legally defensible. 
 Wise policy: By basing state targets on a wide range of measures that reduce emissions from existing 
power plants, including shifting generation to existing natural gas plants, meeting feasible renewable 
energy targets, and promoting consumer energy efficiency that reduces demand, EPA has recognized 
the interconnected nature of the energy system and the wide array of measures that impact emissions. 
Allowing states to employ a variety of mechanisms to reduce emissions lets them choose the most 
cost-effective mechanisms, allows EPA to achieve greater aggregate GHG reductions, and helps 
facilitate a transition to a more sustainable energy system.  
 Legally sound: Glicksman and Buzbee explain that the CAA instructs EPA to identify the best system 
of emission reduction, providing clear textual support for EPA’s analysis of the energy sector as an 
interconnected system and EPA’s inclusion of numerous feasible emission reduction mechanisms. 
EPA’s § 111(d) emissions guidelines are performance standards, not strict technological 
requirements, and it makes sense for EPA to consider all of the mechanisms available for achieving 
improved performance.  
 An Administrative Law Primer: As the foregoing discussion reveals, there is little question that the 
constitutionality and legality of the CPP will be challenged in court, likely as soon as the final rule is 
released. Because courts use principles of administrative law to structure their review of agency rules, 
CPR Member Scholar and administrative law expert Melissa Powers provides an overview of the 
potentially relevant administrative law principles that the courts are likely to utilize — and the parties 
are likely to argue. 
Implications	for	the	Energy	Sector	
Much of the CPP’s promise, and almost all of its attendant controversy, stems from its potential to 
significantly impact the U.S. energy sector. CPR Member Scholars address a range of issues in this area:  
Energy Governance: CPR Member Scholar Emily Hammond, an expert on administrative and energy 
law, takes up two governance issues. First, she considers the implications of the traditional regulatory 
divide between electricity and environmental policy. After illustrating the importance of agency 
coordination generally, Hammond emphasizes that to ensure a reliable, green electricity system under the 
CPP, state environmental agencies, which have primary authority for CPP compliance, will need to 
carefully coordinate with state utility commissions, which have primary authority over electricity 
generation and delivery. Second, she notes recent case law suggesting that states’ policy options for 
compliance may be limited depending on whether their electricity markets are restructured. Regardless, in 
light of preemption concerns, Hammond urges that states exercise caution in formulating CPP compliance 
options, if they wish to address wholesale electricity market dysfunctions that under-incentivize 
investment in reliable, low-carbon electricity.  
Impacts on the Energy Industry: Assuming that the final CPP continues to base state targets on renewable 
energy and increased consumer energy efficiency, utilities will likely continue to argue that the CPP 
threatens their viability as an industry. CPR Member Scholar Joseph P. Tomain, an expert on the history 
and structure of the energy system, argues that electricity sector spokespeople overstate the likely 
economic impact of the CPP and undervalue its capacity to adapt to change, a capacity demonstrated 
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repeatedly over the last several decades. He further observes that many utilities and states are already 
taking steps consistent with the CPP. Because the industry’s capacity to adapt is not only a function of 
industry willingness to innovate, but also of appropriate and responsive state regulatory structures, 
Tomain urges states to evaluate and adjust their utility regulations to ensure that they facilitate rather than 
impede utility compliance with the CPP. 
Electricity Reliability: Utilities have also argued that, if the final CPP follows the lead of the draft, it 
could compromise the reliability of the U.S. energy supply. Tackling the articulated reliability concerns 
one by one, Tomain argues that none of the asserted risks to reliability are significant. Although the CPP 
will contribute to the existing trend of retiring coal-fired power plants, new renewables, including 
distributed renewables, plus increased energy efficiency, can fill the gap. States employing renewables 
will face new challenges in ensuring adequate load-balancing — having supply when it is needed — but 
they have successfully managed the challenge to date. He acknowledges that new energy resources will 
require new transmission planning and investment, often on a multi-state level. Many states are, however, 
already actively engaged in such planning, and others should follow their lead. Tomain argues that the 
states and utilities have the capacity to engage in the planning and investment necessary to meet the 
expected CPP targets without compromising reliability, and all within EPA’s expected compliance 
deadlines. 
Transitioning to Clean Energy: Like the draft CPP, the final CPP is likely to allow states to employ 
whatever means they choose to achieve state targets — whether or not the specific mechanism was 
included in calculating the state’s target. Tomain observes that, although EPA’s flexibility has many 
advantages, it also poses certain perils. Certain paths, like industry-wide efficiency standards, renewable 
energy, and consumer energy efficiency standards, are likely to lead to a true transition to a clean energy 
economy. Other paths, like adopting carbon capture and sequestration, nuclear energy, and increased 
reliance on natural gas (particularly natural gas recovered through fracking) pose multiple environmental 
risks and could jeopardize progress toward truly clean energy. Notwithstanding the CPP’s expected 
flexibility, Tomain urges states to avoid investing in environmentally questionable energy choices and to 
choose more environmentally sustainable compliance paths.  
Regional Collaboration: Opportunities and Challenges. Although the final CPP will set state-specific 
targets, the energy grid in much of the country crosses state lines. Energy law expert and CPR Member 
Scholar Alexandra B. Klass analyzes the benefits and limitations of regional collaboration to meet targets, 
an option permitted in the proposed rule and expected to continue in the final CPP. She notes that regional 
multistate collaboration better reflects the realities of the existing grid and offers efficiencies as each state 
maximizes its most cost-effective options. She identifies the different forms of collaboration that could be 
possible. Klass notes that states may be unlikely to engage in the formal collaboration envisioned by the 
draft CPP, but that other forms of collaboration, such as separate targets combined with interstate trading, 
could offer significant benefits. The draft CPP created questions about how to “count” and track 
reductions across states, so an important issue to watch will be the degree to which the final CPP allows 
and facilitates more informal collaborations. In addition, Klass observes that states may wish to convert 
their state targets into mass-based targets to facilitate regional interstate trading and avoid accounting 
complexities that could emerge with rate-based targets.  
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Discrete Implementation Issues 
Cap-and-Trade. The draft CPP allowed states to meet their state targets through the use of existing or 
newly developed intrastate or interstate cap-and-trade programs, and the final CPP is expected to follow 
suit. CPR Member Scholars address the wisdom and legality of allowing cap-and-trade as a compliance 
option, and then focus on the issues presented by the use of offsets or non-utility reductions to meet the 
target. 
 The Wisdom and Legality of Allowing Cap-and-Trade: CPR Member Scholar Robert L. Glicksman 
argues that the cap-and-trade option reduces costs for states, increases the efficiency of emission 
reductions, and builds on existing state GHG reduction programs, like the northeastern states’ 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) program and California’s trading program. Although 
§ 111(d) does not explicitly refer to trading programs, the courts have upheld trading programs in 
other regulatory contexts, and § 111 references another statutory provision (§ 110) that explicitly 
endorses the use of trading programs. 
 The Use of Offsets and non-GHG Allowances to Meet State Targets: Although EPA allows states to 
meet their state targets with cap-and-trade programs, the draft CPP nonetheless required that the states 
demonstrate actual reductions from existing electricity plants; utilities and states cannot demonstrate 
compliance by using allowances from non-EGU sources or offsets, like credits for carbon sequestered 
through forest conservation. That creates a disjunct with existing GHG cap-and-trade programs, like 
RGGI, which allows offsets, and California’s cap-and-trade program, which allows offsets, 
allowances from non-EGU sources, and allowances from non-U.S. sources. It is unclear whether the 
final rule will or will not allow the use of non-power plant reductions to count. CPR Member 
Scholars weigh in on the debate, offering their views on the policy and constitutional merits of the 
approach. 
o Policy Arguments in Favor of Counting non-EGU Sources: CPR Member Scholar Victor 
Flatt, an expert on environmental trading systems, argues that the final rule should allow 
states to count non-power plant reductions because that approach would be more 
economically efficient, would facilitate later extensions of EPA’s § 111(d) authority to 
additional industries, would make it easier to integrate state and regional programs into 
emerging international trading markets, and would facilitate compliance for those states that 
already have GHG trading programs that extend beyond EGUs. 
o Policy Arguments Against Counting non-EGU Sources: CPR Member Scholar Alice Kaswan 
argues that the final rule should not allow non-power plant sources to count. She asserts that 
the current targets were set based upon the potential for reductions in the electricity sector, 
and that allowing the use of offsets would undercut the incentives to transition to cleaner 
energy. Moreover, if power plants can use offsets to continue emitting, then fewer associated 
co-pollutant benefits will be achieved. 
 Legal Arguments Supporting the Use of Non-Power Plant Sources: Regardless of the policy debate, 
would it be legal for EPA to allow non-power plant sources? CPR Member Scholar Victor Flatt 
analyzes the statutory language and concludes that it does not require that GHG reductions come from 
specific sources or from EGU sources themselves. He argues that the systemwide approach, and its 
acceptance of “beyond the fenceline” reductions, likewise supports acceptance of non-EGU 
reductions. Moreover, § 111(d) is a statutory gap-filler that explicitly references § 110, which 
addresses criteria pollutants and allows substantial state flexibility, suggesting the legality of allowing 
such flexibility under § 111(d) as well. 
Cooperative Federalism and the Question of State Targets. The final CPP, derived from the CAA’s 
cooperative federalism structure, will reflect a particular power dynamic between the federal government 
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and the states. CPR Member Scholar Kirsten H. Engel, an expert on environmental federalism, describes 
federal and state roles under the CPP, and observes the degree to which each state’s target, though based 
on a common methodology, reflects the starkly different energy paths that states have followed in the 
past. She analyzes the pros and cons of this approach. In the expectation that the final methodology and 
resulting state targets will track the proposed rule, she highlights the fact that EPA’s approach, while 
requiring something from all states, essentially defers to the states’ existing patterns, so that states that 
have already engaged in measures to reduce emissions will be expected to continue that trajectory, while 
states that have done little in the past are likely to have much more modest targets. 
Mass-based Targets versus Rate-Based Targets. EPA’s draft rule established emissions-rate-based targets 
for each state, restricting the amount of carbon dioxide that could be emitted per megawatt hour of 
electricity produced. However, EPA allowed states to convert the rate-based target to a mass-based target 
that reflects the total expected emissions. While this may appear to be an arcane technicality, the choice 
between rate-based and mass-based targets has important implications for the administration and integrity 
of the targets. CPR Member Scholar David M. Driesen, an authority on environmental law policy 
mechanisms, argues that mass-based caps better match EPA’s ultimate objective of reducing emissions, 
because they set a fixed limit rather than allowing emissions to increase when and if economic activity 
increases. Moreover, mass-based targets better match the mechanisms EPA has identified for reducing 
emissions, since most of the building block mechanisms reduce the quantity, not the rate, of coal-fired 
power plant emissions. Mass-based targets also make it easier to keep track of reductions, an advantage 
that both simplifies administration and reduces the risk of gaming the system. Driesen suggests that the 
final rule should establish mass-based targets for each state. If, however, it continues to allow the same 
flexibility offered in the draft rule, he urges states to convert their rate-based targets into mass-based 
targets. 
The Clean Power Plan and Environmental Justice. GHGs are not emitted alone; power plant emissions 
simultaneously emit health-impairing levels of traditional pollutants, including sulfur oxides, nitrogen 
oxides, particulates, and mercury. Because strategies to reduce GHGs will inevitably impact such 
associated co-pollutants, their ancillary implications for co-pollutants is a key variable. CPR Member 
Scholar Alice Kaswan, an expert on climate justice, observes that the draft CPP’s systemwide approach 
enables more stringent reduction targets than could be achieved by source-specific regulation, which 
substantially increases not only GHG reductions, but aggregate co-pollutant reductions. In considering the 
distributional impacts of potential compliance mechanisms, Kaswan explains the environmental justice 
critique of cap-and-trade. She argues, however, that, as applied in the energy sector and as limited by 
EPA’s draft rule, cap-and-trade may have fewer relative drawbacks than other GHG cap-and-trade 
programs. In looking ahead to the final rule, a key question will be whether the state targets remain 
stringent enough to induce a shift to clean energy. Because the critical impacts of the CPP will be 
determined by state energy planning, another key question will be whether the federal government will 
follow the advice of environmental justice groups and require states to analyze the environmental justice 
implications of their state implementation plans. To maximize the environmental justice benefits of CPP 
compliance, Kaswan urges states to engage in comprehensive energy planning that retires the most 
harmful plants, encourages the least polluting energy alternatives like renewables and energy efficiency, 
and that addresses the social impacts of energy transition, including higher energy prices. 
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Section	I:	The	Clean	Power	Plan:	A	Brief	Primer	
At the outset, EPA determined that the “best system of emission reduction” (BSER) for existing power 
plants could be achieved through a system-wide approach that takes advantage of both “inside the fence” 
options at power plants and “beyond the fenceline” options, like renewable energy, nuclear power, and 
consumer energy efficiency, all of which reduce emissions from existing power plants. EPA assessed 
each state’s capacity to achieve reductions through available measures and set interim (by 2020) and final 
(by 2030) carbon intensity targets for each state to achieve. In other words, each state must reduce the 
amount of carbon per unit of energy generated. Adding up the emission rates each state is required to 
achieve and translating that into actual predicted emissions, EPA estimates that the states, collectively 
will, by 2030, reduce emissions by 30 percent below 2005 emissions,3 an achievement that will 
demonstrate that the U.S. is at least beginning to do its part to address its contribution to global warming, 
and that will increase pressure on other nations to follow suit.  
Under the CPP, each state is required to develop a state implementation plan (SIP) to demonstrate how it 
will achieve its EPA-set emissions-reductions target. States that develop their own SIPs will have 
significant flexibility to determine how they will reach the target. Although EPA defined each state’s 
target by identifying a range of available measures, EPA did not directly require each state to take the 
measures used to calculate its target. Instead, EPA gave each state the flexibility to achieve its target 
through any combination of mechanisms, including but not limited to the means used to set the target. In 
contrast, states that fail to produce a SIP will cede back to the federal government the authority to decide 
how emissions reductions from existing plants will be achieved. 
In establishing state-specific targets under the draft plan, EPA applied the same BSER formula to each 
state, a formula that consists of four “building blocks.” The first building block consists of traditional 
source-specific regulation: on-site retrofits and efficiency upgrades that could improve an individual 
facility’s emissions’ rate, so that it takes less energy to make energy. EPA has determined that, on 
average, the nation’s coal-fired power plants could engage in retrofits that achieve a 6-percent reduction 
in emissions rates, and so EPA assumed each state could achieve a 6-percent reduction through on-site 
improvements.4  
The remaining building blocks reflect the fact that power plant emissions are determined not only by on-
site actions at power plants, but by “beyond the fenceline” measures that reduce demand for coal-fired 
power and thus reduce emissions from coal-fired power plants. Including these building blocks allowed 
EPA to include numerous additional measures that can much more significantly reduce GHG emissions 
from our existing power sector than more limited on-site tinkering. 
The second building block consists of shifting energy generation from more-polluting coal-fired power 
plants to less-polluting natural gas plants and to nuclear generation. Because many natural gas plants are 
currently underutilized, EPA projects that natural gas plants could run at 70 percent of their capacity, and 
so EPA assumed that each state could shift coal-fired generation to available natural gas plants currently 
operating at less than 70 percent of their capacity.5  
The third building block considers zero-emission energy sources, including renewables and nuclear 
power. Increasing energy generation from renewables and nuclear power will drive down the need to 
generate power, and carbon emissions, from fossil fuel-fired power plants. EPA evaluated the renewable 
portfolio standards in nearby states to assess the degree to which renewable energy options were available 
to each state.6 In addition, state targets were based on the assumption that states would complete nuclear 
power plants now under construction and avoid retiring 6 percent of the existing nuclear generation.7  
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The fourth building block addresses consumer-side energy efficiency measures, such as efficient light 
bulbs and home insulation, which can reduce demand for electricity, thereby lowering emissions from 
existing facilities. EPA assumed that states could increase their energy efficiency by 1.5 percent 
annually.8  
As noted, the CPP gives states considerable flexibility in meeting the state targets. In developing their 
SIPs, states could impose a range of direct requirements and incentives, including facility-specific 
emission rate requirements, emissions-averaging systems that encourage utilities to generate more 
electricity from natural gas than from coal, renewable portfolio standards, or energy efficiency programs. 
They could also work with utilities to shut down the most polluting sources and shift generation to less-
polluting or non-polluting alternatives. Although not included in the BSER calculation, states could build 
new natural gas facilities, implement carbon capture and storage, or invest in nuclear energy; what 
matters is achieving the required emissions reductions from coal-fired power plants, not how the states 
achieve them. 
Significantly, states are permitted to adopt cap-and-trade programs, singly or in combination with other 
states. To facilitate the use of cap-and-trade, which seeks to achieve an absolute limit on emissions rather 
than a certain carbon intensity rate, EPA allows states to translate the carbon intensity standard into a 
mass-based target that sets an absolute cap on the state’s emissions. The cap in a cap-and-trade program 
would limit carbon emissions, and, if functioning effectively, create a price signal and consequent 
incentives for activities that would lead to reductions from existing facilities, including on-site 
improvements, shifts from coal to natural gas, and renewable energy and energy efficiency investments.  
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Section	II:	Confronting	Challenges	to	the	Clean	Power	Plan	
From the start, the Clean Power Plan has been controversial, fundamentally because it challenges the 
existing status quo of our energy system. President Obama campaigned in 2008 on a promise to take 
federal action on the matter, but legislative efforts stalled under the Democratic-controlled Congress early 
in his first term. The President had long maintained that in the absence of congressional action, he would 
direct EPA to use its existing authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate emissions. The Clean Power 
Plan is one product of that effort. 
Many of the same players who rose to challenge earlier climate legislation are similarly opposed to 
regulatory approaches to the problem. Their objections are both large and small, broadly challenging 
EPA’s authority to regulate on the one hand, and disputing the fine details of EPA’s method of regulating 
on the other. This section is devoted to examining some of the broader challenges to the CPP’s overall 
scheme. 
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Recalcitrant	States	and	the	Federal	Implementation	Plan	
By Thomas O. McGarity 
 
The Clean Power Plan (CPP) envisions that the states will bear the primary responsibility for 
implementing its goals. Some Republican politicians, however, have been urging states to sabotage the 
CPP by refusing to implement it. This section explains why refusing to implement the CPP is a very bad 
idea for the recalcitrant state, for its electric power industry, and for its citizens. 
State Opposition to the Clean Power Plan  
The CPP proposal generated a great deal of opposition in some 
states.9 Soon after EPA introduced it, the governors of 15 states 
denounced the plan as an unwarranted intrusion on their states’ 
economies.10 Twelve states joined Murray Energy Corp. in a 
challenge to the CPP while EPA was still taking comments on the 
proposed rule.11  
In March 2015, Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-KY) urged states to “think 
twice” before submitting state implementation plans (SIPs) to EPA to 
implement the CPP.12 He suggested that if enough states boycotted 
the planning process, EPA would not “be able to demonstrate the 
capacity to carry out such political extremism.”13 A “just say no” 
policy would also give Congress “more time to fight back.”14 In any 
event, McConnell warranted that EPA’s Federal Implementation Plan 
(FIP) could not be much worse than a state plan that was sufficiently 
stringent to meet with EPA’s approval.15  
At least two states have apparently signed on to McConnell’s plan. In 
April 2015, Oklahoma’s Republican governor, Mary Fallin, signed an 
executive order declaring that Oklahoma would not submit a Clean Power Plan SIP at the same time that 
she vetoed state legislation providing for implementing such a SIP.16 The Pennsylvania legislature passed 
legislation prohibiting the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection from submitting a 
greenhouse gas SIP without first securing the approval of both houses of the legislature.17  
But the governors of many other states declined McConnell’s invitation.18 Even the governor of 
McConnell’s home state of Kentucky concluded that a state-drafted plan would be superior to a “one-
size-fits-all policy imposed by Washington, D.C.”19 These states were wise to cooperate with EPA, even 
though they may not have been thrilled by the prospect of writing and enforcing SIPs for greenhouse 
gases. 
State and Federal Roles Under the Clean Air Act 
The Clean Air Act assigns important roles to both the federal EPA and the states. State implementation 
plans to implement federal standards are nothing new. Under § 109 of the statute, EPA must promulgate 
ambient air quality standards for ubiquitous pollutants that may endanger public health or welfare.20 
Section 110 then tells the states to write SIPs containing various requirements and/or economic incentives 
that are necessary to achieve the ambient standards by prescribed deadlines.21 EPA must then approve the 
plan if it meets the requirements of § 110. If EPA disapproves the plan and the state fails to correct the 
problems with the plan, EPA must write its own FIP for the state and enforce that plan.  
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Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act requires EPA to establish “a procedure similar to that provided by” 
§ 110 for establishing standards of performance for existing sources and for implementing those standards 
of performance.22 The statute thus anticipates that individual states will, pursuant to guidelines provided 
by EPA, write SIPs for establishing and enforcing standards of performance subject to EPA approval.  
But what about recalcitrant states that fail to submit implementation plans for EPA approval, that submit 
plans that do not establish adequate standards of performance, or that do not adequately enforce EPA-
approved implementation plans? Section 111(d)(2) grants to EPA “the same authority” to prescribe a FIP 
that it has under § 110(c) and the same authority to enforce the plan that it has to enforce SIPs under 
§ 113 and § 114.23 Thus, if a state elects not to go along with the program EPA establishes for existing 
sources under § 111(d), EPA must write and enforce a FIP for the state, and EPA, not the state, will 
choose among the available implementation and enforcement options.  
Ample precedent exists for EPA writing FIPs for the few states that choose to be recalcitrant. A very 
recent precedent involves EPA’s program for implementing its regulations for issuing permits to new and 
modified sources of greenhouse gases (GHG) under the Clean Air Act’s program for preventing 
significant deterioration (PSD) of air quality in areas that meet national air quality standards. After EPA 
promulgated its “tailoring rule,” which prescribed how states should amend their SIPs to provide for 
applying the PSD permit requirements to new and modified sources, nearly 80 percent of the states told 
EPA that they would put GHG permitting programs into effect by the January 2, 2011 deadline.24 Even 
states that were challenging EPA’s authority to promulgate the tailoring rule wanted to put their own 
programs into effect so that their environmental agencies could administer the new GHG permit 
requirements.25 Although six states reported that they lacked authority to administer GHG permitting 
programs and would be unable to submit an approvable plan by the deadline, they all agreed to accept the 
FIP that EPA was in the process of preparing.26 The state of Texas refused to revise its SIP or to accept 
the FIP.27 After issuing a “SIP call” declaring that the plans for the 13 states and Texas were 
“substantially inadequate,” EPA in late December 2011 promulgated FIPs that took over the permitting 
process for new and modified stationary sources of GHGs in eight states, including Texas.28 Power plants 
in those states had to seek one permit from the state agency for emissions of pollutants other that GHGs 
and another permit from EPA for GHG emissions.29  
EPA’s use of FIPS has often served as a catalyst to prompt states’ eventual compliance. For example, 
after the D.C. Circuit rejected the states’ challenge to the tailoring rule on standing grounds,30 the affected 
industries lobbied state legislatures to pass authorizing legislation. It did not take long for all of the states, 
including Texas, to submit and secure EPA approval of SIPs implementing the GHG permit program.31 
Why States Should Write Their Own SIPs  
For power plants in states that fail to submit adequate SIPs for implementing the CPP rule, things could 
be much worse than for states that refuse to implement the tailoring rule. EPA is in the process of writing 
a generic FIP that will guide its regional offices in crafting state-specific FIPs for states that fail to submit 
adequate SIPs. It plans to publish the draft FIP along with the final CPP rule.32 Although we will not 
know what EPA has in mind for recalcitrant states until it publishes the generic FIP, it is likely to be less 
industry-friendly than the SIPs that states could develop on their own.33 A FIP might very well require 
separate EPA-enforced permits for GHG emissions from existing power plants like the separate EPA-
enforced permits implementing the tailoring rule. Most importantly, EPA, in implementing a FIP, has 
fewer, and less desirable, emission-reduction options than the states. States, in their SIPs, can rely on an 
array of cost-effective and beneficial emission-reduction strategies, including demand response, energy 
conservation, and renewable energy programs. But EPA probably lacks the power to create such 
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programs, and is likely to have direct authority only over power plants. Thus, the FIP is likely to demand 
that the target be met through more emissions reductions from the power plants over which it does have 
control.34 The additional costs of dual regulation and additional costs that arise due to the inability to 
require low-cost emission reduction measures will ultimately be borne by the state’s ratepayers. The 
prospect of EPA imposing an ill-fitting FIP on states that do not have approved SIPs should therefore 
serve as a powerful incentive to power plant operators to demand that state legislatures and agencies 
promulgate acceptable SIPs.35 
Conclusion  
Some state governors and regulators may be tempted to use the publication of the final CPP rule as an 
opportunity to thumb their noses at the federal government. While that may win debate points with some 
of their federal government-hating constituents, it will not be a good thing for the electric power industry 
in those states. Nor will it be good for the ratepayers who will have to pick up the tab for an inefficient 
dual regulatory system. 
Recommendations	
 EPA should ensure that power plants in any state that lacks an adequate SIP achieve the CPP’s 
GHG emission reduction goals for that state using all of the tools available to the agency, 
including imposing a FIP if necessary.  
 Because states have more regulatory options for achieving the goals of the CPP, states should not 
heed the advice of a few obstructionist politicians to refuse to implement the Clean Power Plan.  
 Instead, states should aggressively implement those goals by submitting SIPs to EPA that ensure 
that the GHG reduction targets in the Plan are achieved by the deadlines set forth in the CPP. 
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The	Constitution	and	the	Clean	Power	Plan	
By William W. Buzbee and Robert L. Glicksman 
Since EPA’s publication of the Clean Power Plan § 111(d) proposed rule, claims of constitutional 
infirmity have been made by opponents and scholars, including Harvard Law School Professor Laurence 
Tribe, acting as a private lawyer for a large coal company opposed to the rule. Some claims primarily 
reflect dissatisfaction with the manner in which Congress structured the Clean Air Act rather than claims 
of constitutional infirmity, while other arguments do implicate 
constitutional questions, although we find it unlikely that EPA’s 
final rule will run afoul of the Constitution. This section breaks out 
the main constitutional concerns and claims, showing how EPA’s 
action is both constrained by the Constitution yet unlikely to violate 
it because, under existing Supreme Court precedent, the CPP meets 
the Court’s clear parameters for forms of permissible regulation. If 
issued in a form substantially similar to the proposed rule, the final 
§ 111(d) rule should easily surmount any constitutional challenges. 
The ‘Delegation Doctrine’ 
Opponents of the CPP have asserted that a congressional drafting 
error created a fundamental ambiguity and thus failed to provide 
the agency with sufficiently clear direction. Rarely in U.S. history 
has the Supreme Court found violations of the “delegation 
doctrine,” which is also sometimes called the “nondelegation 
doctrine.” The basic concept behind this body of constitutional law 
is that Congress cannot give away its legislative power to an 
executive agency; the legislative power cannot be delegated. As articulated by the courts, the doctrine 
really boils down to a prohibition on empty, overly broad delegations to agencies. The law must provide 
an “intelligible principle” to guide agencies in the exercise of delegated authority and discretion. 
However, the Supreme Court has found violations of this doctrine in only two cases, both from the early 
New Deal.  
Since then, in case after case, the Court has upheld very broad delegations of power, sometimes even 
involving short statutes that provide little more than a mandate to an agency to act in the “public interest.” 
In the 2001 Whitman v. American Trucking case,36 the Supreme Court not only rejected a nondelegation 
challenge to portions of the Clean Air Act, but also to a large extent put a nail in the doctrine’s coffin. The 
Court’s opinion, by noted conservative Justice Antonin Scalia, cited to many cases upholding delegations 
that, in fact, are far broader than language at issue in that case or in § 111(d). The Court acknowledged 
judicial discomfort with telling Congress how narrowly to confer power on agencies. Since the § 111(d) 
regulation is part of the same lengthy and quite detailed law as the one at issue in American Trucking, 
such a claim is unlikely to prevail. 
Another element of American Trucking is also important here. CPP critics have suggested that, even if the 
delegation is too broad, EPA could remedy the infirmity with a narrower approach to its § 111(d) 
regulation. However, the Court has made clear that, if there is a nondelegation doctrine infirmity, nothing 
EPA could do could save its action because the problem stems from Congress’ overly broad or vague 
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language. The nondelegation doctrine cannot be used by CPP adversaries to indirectly steer the agency in 
a desired regulatory direction.  
Opponents of EPA’s proposed rule have identified a specific aspect of the Clean Air Act provision 
purporting to authorize EPA to issue the rule that, they claim, violates the delegation doctrine. When 
Congress amended the Clean Air Act in 1990, it passed and the President signed two versions of § 111(d) 
that are slightly different, without reconciling them.37 The rule’s opponents assert that this drafting error 
and resulting ambiguity create a delegation doctrine infirmity. Under this theory, the very need for a 
harmonizing or reconciling agency interpretation to make sense of the law is evidence of a missing 
“intelligible principle.” Here, EPA’s final rule and accompanying explanation in its “preamble” and 
possible accompanying legal memoranda could be somewhat important, although not literally able to cure 
a nondelegation problem (far-fetched though it is). Were EPA to throw up its proverbial hands and be so 
imprudent as to claim it could do whatever it wants to reconcile and harmonize the two clashing 
enactments, that might give litigants and reviewing courts an opening to find a nondelegation infirmity. 
But EPA is highly unlikely to do so. Instead, as in the proposed rule and accompanying materials, EPA 
will be able to make sense of these provisions despite the interpretive challenges they pose. Such dueling 
enactments, as with hundreds of other settings where laws or provisions leave an important ambiguity, do 
not create a constitutional crisis. Instead, they create an ambiguity where, under the oft-cited Chevron 
case, an agency is given first crack at providing a reasonable interpretation and will usually receive 
substantial deference from reviewing courts.38 And drafting errors have never been the basis for a law’s 
invalidation under the delegation doctrine. 
Takings Violations?  
Perhaps the most far-fetched claim of those asserting a constitutional infirmity in the § 111(d) rule is that 
requiring power plants to reduce their pollution gives rise to a “takings” claim. Although government 
regulation can in rare instances give rise to a “regulatory takings” claim based on the regulation’s 
profound impact on private property rights, requiring the government either to abandon the regulation or 
provide “just compensation” for the loss in value, ordinary regulation by governments to address a risk to 
safety, health, or the environment does not cause a taking just because compliance will cost the regulated 
industry money or even, in the long term, make it less competitive. Such a claim is so untenable that this 
analysis will move to more nuanced claims, although they, too, are unlikely to be successful. 
Federalism and 10th Amendment Claims 
Professor Tribe and others have also claimed that the § 111(d) rule runs afoul of federalism doctrine and 
the 10th Amendment by infringing upon traditional state prerogatives and policy discretion in regulating 
electric power generation. The proposal is carefully structured to fall comfortably within the bounds of 
constitutional regulatory strategies; EPA would have to dramatically extend its control over the states 
before it would run afoul of federalism principles or the 10th Amendment.  
As described in more detail below, this rule, which establishes a federal guideline and then provides states 
with options for meeting it, represents a quite ordinary and constitutionally acceptable form of 
“cooperative federalism.” Such cooperative federalism strategies have long been upheld by the Supreme 
Court, with such cases quite explicitly talking about both permissible strategies and a few easily avoidable 
unconstitutional regulatory forms.39 In short, these precedents establish that Congress may establish 
federal goals and give states the choice to implement a regulatory program necessary to achieve those 
goals or refuse to do so and allow the federal government to implement the program in its stead. In 
addition, in a just-decided case, Mississippi Commission on Environmental Quality v. Environmental 
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Protection Agency,40 in which industry raised federalism challenges similar to the claims likely to be 
made against the CPP, the D.C. Circuit recognized the Clean Air Act’s and EPA’s constitutionally 
permissible use of cooperative federalism strategies. 
EPA’s proposed CPP is consistent with these principles. If Congress or EPA tried to order the states to do 
exactly as the federal government wanted in pursuit of federal goals, with such laws or regulations 
effectively “commandeering” the state legislative process and administrative apparatus and leaving the 
states no choice but to comply or be penalized, then the action could run afoul of anti-commandeering 
principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in its 10th Amendment jurisprudence. The circumstances in 
which federal regulatory programs raise legitimate 10th Amendment concerns are discussed in the famous 
Hodel, New York v. United States,41 and Printz42 cases. Those cases, however, like the new Mississippi 
case, simultaneously endorse cooperative federalism programs and provide a road map to EPA or 
Congress about how federal regulatory programs can avoid unduly infringing on state authority. Indeed, 
among the statutory programs the Supreme Court has upheld in the face of 10th Amendment attacks is a 
federal statute constraining state choices in setting rates for electricity generators.43 
EPA has carefully structured its proposal to avoid federalism problems. The § 111(d) rule sets an 
emissions-rate standard for greenhouse gas emissions in each state. (States are given the option to convert 
that rate-based approach to a mass-based approach.) States have to develop a state implementation plan 
(SIP) to meet this pollution reduction target. However, if they choose not to do so, EPA can itself come in 
and act as the regulator. Such a choice — do it yourself or have the federal government step in — is 
explicitly approved in all four cited relevant precedents. It is consistent with the exercise of federal 
supremacy in a manner that respects state sovereignty: the federal government can set targets as a federal 
requirement, but then give states the choice to derive responsive strategies or leave the choices (and all of 
the work) to the federal government.44 States, however, seldom decline to exercise such optional 
authority. States tend to seek and jealously guard their retention of such planning discretion under 
“delegated programs,” the most prevalent form of cooperative federalism. 
But critics have argued that EPA’s mix of permissible “building blocks” for states to achieve reduction 
targets goes too far. These claims are in error: EPA can give states a simple edict backed by potential 
federal enforcement, but also then indicate more flexible means that states and their power plants and 
others could adopt to reduce their carbon emissions. So here, too, EPA’s proposal sets a pollution 
reduction target by capping emissions levels for each state, but provides states broad discretion to choose 
how to comply (including any combination of the building blocks identified by EPA), or to “just say no” 
and refuse to participate in the program, allowing EPA to step in with its own Federal Implementation 
Plan (FIP) for that state. In other programs, EPA has often set federal requirements and then given states 
guidance on strategies that the agency would approve in overseeing state plans. EPA’s guidance helps 
states avoid wasted implementation efforts and shares EPA’s expertise with the states and affected entities 
and constituencies. Guidance that dictated state programs and precluded other choices might be 
problematic, but the CPP is laden with language of discretion and state choice. That approach is unlikely 
to change in the final rule. In short, the CPP’s cooperative federalism structure is fully consistent with 
settled federalism principles. 
New and Existing Power Plants in State Plans  
As several commentators, think tanks, and economic consultants have shown, and EPA’s building block 
discussion also explains and encourages, both cost-effectiveness goals and carbon emissions reduction 
goals will likely be met most effectively if states not only derive broad trading regimes, but also allow 
existing high polluting plants’ energy production to be replaced with low- or no-pollution forms of energy 
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production, often from new plants. Hence new and existing plants would likely be covered by a state plan 
seeking to maximize flexibility and minimize regulatory costs, despite § 111(d)’s focus on existing 
sources. This might initially seem odd, but states acting under a delegated program planning regime have 
always had broad authority to derive credible strategies to meet federal pollution reduction goals. And 
that can involve including new plants and demand reduction strategies — as well as any other credible, 
sound strategies — in plans to meet the federal reduction cap.  
One question is whether states’ adoption, with EPA encouragement, of such an inclusive approach would 
conflict with the Clean Air Act, and therefore be preempted. We conclude that such state plans would 
clearly be permissible both under the Constitution and under the statute’s “plan” and savings clause 
provisions. 
Well-established federalism doctrine combined with the Clean Air Act’s broad “savings” clause45 are 
together important in empowering states to devise economical and effective state plans. Many analysts, 
industries, and EPA as well, see great benefits to states using the building blocks to design plans that will 
create broad, possibly statewide or even multi-state trading regimes to maximize flexibility and minimize 
costs associated with achieving the CPP’s reduction goals. As discussed in our articles elsewhere in this 
paper on the CPP’s systemwide approach, § 111(d) explicitly cross-references § 110’s planning procedure 
for SIPs and calls for states to devise § 111(d) plans or be subjected to a FIP. Very important to the 
workability of this design is both enduring Supreme Court law confirming that the Clean Air Act gives 
states broad discretion to design plans meeting air pollution 
reduction targets,46 and the Clean Air Act’s “savings” 
clause.47 This savings clause recognizes state power to 
provide more protection (here pollution reductions) than 
mandated by federal law.  
In fact, such savings clauses are the norm in federal 
environmental law, preserving state authority to provide 
protections for their environment and citizens that go 
beyond what federal law requires. In the parlance of 
federalism, federal law is almost always a floor, not a ceiling. Such savings clauses are not 
constitutionally required, but are rooted in respect for state roles that is reflected in the Constitution and 
federalism jurisprudence. Such clauses also reflect a pragmatic choice; it is hard to recognize states’ broad 
plenary police powers to protect their citizens and the environment yet somehow preclude their doing 
more to protect against a risk.  
Since power plants and their operations involve siting choices, state public utility commissions, a wide 
array of pollutants, energy policies of many sorts, and also common law protections, preclusion of 
additional state action regarding the energy sector would be especially unlikely and difficult to design or 
enact. Hence, states will be acting in ways consistent with the Clean Air Act if (and likely when) they 
derive a plan utilizing a mix of strategies to meet pollution reduction targets, provided they do not violate 
a requirement of the Clean Air Act. These two interrelated pieces of law — states’ SIP planning 
discretion and “savings” clause preservation of state power to provide additional protection — combine to 
give states expansive authority to derive palatable strategies to reduce pollution, so long as they can 
credibly show that they will meet or exceed federal targets.  
Claims of ‘Unconstitutional Coercion’ Through Conditional Spending Constraints  
Commandeering of the states is prohibited but generally avoidable, as discussed above. The recent 
Supreme Court health care decision, National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,48 did 
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recognize an additional federalism prohibition, namely, the federal government cannot use the threat of 
withholding federal funds to coerce states to do as the federal government wants. But that decision also 
discussed the federal governments’ longstanding authority to provide states with a range of permitted 
choices under cooperative federalism doctrine. The Court held that the Affordable Care Act could not use 
a conditional federal spending strategy not only to deny uncooperative states new financial support, but 
also to trigger loss of vast federal support under earlier longstanding health care programs. NFIB was the 
first Supreme Court case ever to find conditional federal spending to be unconstitutionally coercive, and 
emphasized the extraordinary nature and size of the monetary threat. The Clean Air Act does contain 
possible threats to federal highway funding for several sorts of state defaults,49 but as found in the just-
issued Mississippi decision, those modest threats do not come close to the unconstitutional coercion in 
NFIB.50 Nothing in NFIB supports the recognition of a general prohibition on federal use of supremacy-
based or monetary incentives to persuade states to play an effective regulatory role. Cooperative 
federalism always rests on state choice in light of federal incentives. Incentives are not automatically 
coercive. 
The FIP: The More Interesting Legal Puzzle  
EPA has indicated that around the time it issues the CPP it will also propose a FIP, or a menu of likely 
FIP strategies, for notice and comment. How EPA construes the law to give itself, or not give itself, 
discretion to adopt trading regimes or bring new plants into a CPP pollution cap will be interesting. 
States’ discretionary authority is broadly preserved by the Clean Air Act’s savings clause and the § 110 
planning provisions and linked case law incorporated by reference in § 111(d). This broad preservation of 
state power is in turn rooted in the general presumption of retained state police powers. EPA’s 
forthcoming FIP proposal will necessarily be rooted in what the Clean Air Act authorizes. The federal 
government does not have the same sort of “saved” plenary police power as the states.  
Conclusion 
In their zeal to scuttle the CPP, EPA’s opponents have raised a plethora of allegedly fatal constitutional 
infirmities. But under close examination, the claims fail. The various contentions that § 111(d) of the 
Clean Air Act violates the nondelegation doctrine are far-fetched, ignoring decades’ worth of Supreme 
Court precedents allowing broad delegations of policy-making discretion to agencies, including a recent 
decision upholding different provisions of the Clean Air Act. Arguments that the § 111(d) rule, in its 
proposed form, works as a compensable taking of utilities’ private property border on the frivolous. The 
federalism-based attacks on the CPP appear to warrant more serious consideration. But the approach 
reflected in the CPP proposal — establishing federal emissions targets for each state, allowing the states 
the option of devising plans to achieve the targets, and providing for federal takeover of planning, 
implementation, and enforcement responsibilities if a state chooses not to participate — is fully consistent 
with Supreme Court federalism precedents endorsing cooperative federalism programs. The CPP proposal 
did not run afoul of the 10th Amendment or federalism-based constraints on the exercise of the federal 
spending power. The final rule is also highly unlikely to do so. 
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EPA’s	Systemwide	Approach:	The	Policy	and	Legal	Debate	on	
Regulating	Beyond	the	Fenceline		
By Robert L. Glicksman and William W. Buzbee 
 
Much of the debate over the Clean Power Plan has focused on how EPA’s proposal incorporates 
strategies to reduce emissions at power plants not only through emission-control and efficiency measures 
at the plants themselves, but also through “beyond the fenceline” measures that include replacing high 
carbon energy production at existing plants with low- or zero-emitting generation sources and with 
demand-reduction measures that reduce emissions at regulated sources.” Some critics have argued that 
this last element — beyond the fenceline measures — is impermissible, while EPA and supporters assert 
that it is not only on strong legal footing but that it represents a logical and cost-effective approach. This 
section reviews both the policy and legal arguments, highlighting explanations and justifications, as well 
as responses to criticisms likely to be made upon issuance of EPA’s final rule.  
The Beyond the Fenceline Debate  
In its proposal, and likely its final rule, EPA calculates state-by-state pollution targets using means to 
achieve emissions reductions that are already in widespread use in states and the energy sector, some of 
which extend beyond the fenceline of individual regulated plants but that have the effect of reducing 
emissions from regulated power plants. In discussing various emission reduction strategies that the states 
might pursue, EPA repeatedly indicates that it anticipates allowing states and power plants to rely on an 
array of measures that go “beyond the fenceline” so that states are not confined in their efforts to reduce 
power plant emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to technological improvements at individual coal-
burning power plants. Some states are already using some of these strategies, such as Renewable Portfolio 
Standards, energy efficiency programs, or statewide or regional cap-and-trade programs for greenhouse 
gas emissions like those being implemented in California and through the northeastern states’ Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative.  
More specifically, in the proposed rulemaking, EPA identifies four “building blocks” it believes will 
enable states to achieve targeted emission caps by reducing GHG emissions at regulated power plants: 
reducing carbon intensity through improvements in heat rates at individual plants; reducing reliance on 
carbon-intensive generating units such as coal-fired units by increasing the use of existing natural gas 
plants; replacing carbon-intensive generating units with low- or zero-carbon generation, such as 
renewable energy production; and relying on programs to reduce electricity demand. EPA and its 
supporters have applauded these building blocks, which states can use together or in part as they see fit, as 
cost-effective and flexible means for states and their power sectors to meet reduction targets. 
Significantly, only the first of these building blocks embraces the traditional approach to stationary source 
control utilized under the Clean Air Act since the early 1970s — reducing emissions through the setting 
of performance standards based on assessment of technological controls or operational practices available 
for the type of regulated facility. The other three entail a broader approach to reducing regulated power 
plant emissions through a systemwide focus on a utility’s entire set of operations at multiple plants, or the 
performance of many or all utilities in a particular state or region, including demand reduction. Energy 
sector experts, economists, many states, and many energy companies applaud these more flexible and 
cost-effective approaches, but utilities and industries heavily dependent on carbon-intensive energy 
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sources, especially coal-based businesses, generally describe them as a devastating threat and have argued 
that they are beyond EPA’s statutory authority. We believe EPA’s approach is sound both as a matter of 
policy and law. 
The Benefits of a Systemwide Approach 
From a policy perspective, EPA’s systemwide approach offers numerous benefits over a more limited 
inside-the-fenceline approach. As discussed in detail below, unlike other regulated industries, power plant 
emissions are affected not just by individual plant 
characteristics, but by systemic factors that determine how 
much a given plant operates. In seeking to reduce regulated 
power plant emissions, to focus only on technical changes 
inside the fence of a particular electric generating unit (EGU) 
would miss available and cost-effective opportunities to reduce 
GHG emissions from existing sources.  
One benefit of a systemwide approach is that it increases the 
cost-effectiveness of GHG emissions reductions. Building 
blocks that extend beyond the fenceline of individual EGUs 
allow states to adopt flexible § 111(d) plans that authorize 
states and their power plants to meet their GHG targets at 
lower cost. It may be cheaper, for example, for a utility to 
replace some of its coal-fired generating capacity with power 
derived from cleaner fuel sources than to improve heat rates at 
each of its plants. But it will often be even cheaper to develop 
strategies that reduce energy user demand, especially demand 
during times of peak usage. By shaving off such demand, 
fewer power plants are needed or plants will less frequently 
need to ramp up energy production. So a systemwide approach 
that allows states and utilities to reduce emissions by reducing 
demand instead of by investing in expensive retrofits can save 
consumers money and reduce costs for power plants covered 
by a state plan. 
A second benefit of a systemwide approach is that it allows 
EPA to achieve greater aggregate GHG reductions. EPA 
estimates that retrofits to increase the efficiency of existing 
coal-fired power plants can achieve only about a 6-percent 
reduction in emissions rates. By including a wider range of available and cost-effective options, the 
agency can achieve much more significant aggregate reductions. As climate change impacts continue to 
accelerate, the ability to achieve greater reductions at lower costs is a significant advantage. 
Lastly, a systemwide approach helps facilitate the transition to a cleaner energy economy. There is no 
need to maintain high emissions from existing coal-fired power plants when sustainable alternatives are 
readily available. An approach that recognizes the shortcomings of continued reliance on high-emitting 
facilities and encourages a transition to greater reliance on alternatives will strengthen the U.S. energy 
sector. 
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A Section 111(d) Roadmap 
In order to analyze the legality of EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan, it is useful to provide a roadmap to 
EPA’s legal authority under § 111(d) of the Clean Air Act. Once EPA has set new source performance 
standards for a source category under § 111(b), § 111(d) requires EPA to initiate a regulatory process for 
existing sources in the same category. The sources at issue in this rulemaking are existing EGUs, or 
power plants. 
The nuances of the federal and state roles are reviewed below, but the basic process involves EPA setting 
emissions guidelines (which in effect amount to pollution reduction targets) for each state. Under § 111(d) 
of the CAA, EPA must establish “standards of performance” for existing source categories for which EPA 
has adopted new source standards under § 111(b). The definition of a standard of performance is the same 
for both § 111(b) and § 111(d); the standards must reflect the degree of emission limitation achievable 
through the application of the best system of emission reduction (BSER) that EPA has determined has 
been adequately demonstrated. Once EPA sets federal emission guidelines, § 111(d) requires that states 
submit “plans” capable of meeting the emission reduction targets set by EPA. In describing the plans 
required under § 111(d), the statute explicitly cross-references § 110, the CAA provision setting forth 
terms and procedures for state implementation plans (SIPs) created to meet National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (NAAQS). EPA must itself step in and take over the process should a state decline to derive a 
plan or if a state fails to submit a “satisfactory plan.” In such a circumstance, the federal government is 
supposed to design a Federal Implementation Plan, or FIP. 
Textual and Structural Justification for the Section 111(d) Clean Power Plan 
The legality of EPA’s reliance on and authorization of measures beyond the fenceline to reduce GHG 
emissions from regulated power plants has been little tested in the courts because EPA rarely exercises its 
authority under § 111(d) to control existing stationary sources, and when it has done so it has not 
regulated an industry that lent itself to the wide range of reduction strategies possible in the energy sector. 
No case has definitively interpreted the central term “system of emission reduction” in a context 
analogous to the current one. Nevertheless, as EPA will likely flesh out in greater detail in its final rule 
and accompanying materials, the legal basis for this approach is quite strong and, on the merits, deserves 
to be upheld by reviewing courts.  
It is worth making an initial broad, thematic point: § 111(d) standards are performance standards, and the 
whole idea behind a performance standard is that what matters is the end result, not how a regulated entity 
gets there. Appropriately, EPA’s approach is end-result oriented, because what matters is that utilities in 
the aggregate — a state’s energy sector — reduce their GHG emissions sufficiently to reach EPA’s 
targeted levels. Through the Clean Power Plan and its building block approach, EPA has given states 
broad flexibility in deciding how to get there, especially encouraging cost-effective strategies to achieve 
GHG emission reductions. 
A central question here is whether GHG-reducing measures that extend beyond the fenceline qualify as 
“systems” of emission reduction. As indicated above, state 111(d) plans establishing “standards of 
performance” must reflect the degree of emission limitation achievable through the application of the 
“best system of emission reduction” that EPA determines has been adequately demonstrated.51 EPA’s 
position is that all four building blocks qualify as “systems of emission reduction” because they either (1) 
improve the carbon intensity of the affected EGUs in generating electricity; or (2) because of the 
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integrated nature of the electricity grid and the fungibility of electricity and electricity services, they 
displace or avoid the need for generation from those sources and thereby reduce emissions from them. 
States, state public utility commissions, and power plants themselves in an array of regulatory 
environments have long adjusted plans for new capacity, rates, and energy sources in light of the sorts of 
variables here identified by EPA as building blocks.  
The CAA nowhere defines the term “system.” Because the statute is silent on that question, the meaning 
of the term must come from someplace else. One place that courts often turn to in interpreting undefined 
statutory terms is the dictionary. Typical dictionary definitions of the word “system” include “an 
assemblage or combination of things or parts forming a complex or unitary whole,” or “any assemblage 
or set of correlated members,” or “a coordinated body of methods or a scheme or plan of procedure or 
organizational scheme.” EPA cited a similar definition in a Legal Memorandum that accompanied 
issuance of the proposed rule.52 Defining a “system” of utility emission reduction to include units 
operating in the same state and owned by the same utility under a central dispatch system is consistent 
with all of those definitions, but it also logically could be and is interpreted more expansively in light of 
the integrated and interdependent elements of the power sector. 
The 1990 amendments changed the definition of a “standard of performance” in a way that supports 
EPA’s interpretation of that term to include beyond-the-fenceline measures. Congress deleted the portion 
of the definition (added in 1977) that required emission limits to be based on “the best technological 
system of continuous emission reduction.” EPA’s position is that, as a result of this change, the systems 
of emission reduction upon which § 111(d) standards of performance may be based are not limited to 
technological systems. Indeed, the Conference Committee report on the 1977 amendments stated that, 
even when § 111(b) standards for new sources had to be based on the best technological system of 
continuous emission reduction, § 111(d) standards for existing sources could reflect means of emission 
control that are “not necessarily technological.”53 By allowing non-technological mechanisms, Congress 
opened the door to emissions reduction mechanisms, like greater reliance on lower-emitting sources or 
efficiency, that do not depend upon technical fixes at the source. 
The fact that EPA’s systemwide approach differs from previous, more facility-focused regulatory efforts 
does not mean that it is illegitimate. The Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court’s first 
climate change case, emphasized that Congress intended to delegate to EPA the authority to adjust its 
approach and policies to address novel and unprecedented situations. The statute is not designed to 
produce obsolescence.54  
In addition, EPA has the authority — if not the obligation — to define a term such as “system” 
contextually. In Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, the Supreme Court called for such contextual 
treatment of the term “air pollutant,” noting that the term may mean different things for purposes of 
different CAA programs.55 Relatedly, in another recent case under the Clean Air Act, Michigan v. EPA, 
the Court again emphasized the importance of statutory context and the agency obligation to integrate 
linked provisions and language: Agencies cannot engage in “interpretive gerrymanders under which an 
agency keeps part of statutory context it likes while throwing away parts it dislikes.”56 Such a mandate is 
especially important where, as under § 111(d), the statute engages in explicit cross-referencing of § 111 
and § 110.  
Similarly, it appears reasonable for EPA to determine that the best way to achieve the goals of § 111(d) 
regulation is to address the meaning of the term “system” based on the configuration and method of 
operation of the particular industry being regulated. In its proposed rule, EPA relied repeatedly on the 
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unique characteristics of carbon pollution and the interconnected nature of the electric power sector to 
justify its “beyond the fenceline” approach. Accordingly, even if a “system” of emission reduction is 
defined more conventionally as source-specific pollution controls for many industrial source categories, it 
seems reasonable for EPA to include within the term all of the mechanisms a state could use to reduce 
emissions from the EGUs targeted by EPA’s § 111(d) rule, including power plant controls, shifts in 
generation to lower- and no-emitting sources, and utility and state policies to increase consumer 
efficiency.  
There is precedent in the context of other CAA programs for the kind of cost-saving and market-
embracing rationales EPA has offered to justify its § 111(d) proposal. Section 111(d) authorizes EPA to 
require states to submit plans that establish standards of performance for “existing sources”57 of pollutants 
not regulated under the NAAQS or hazardous air pollutant programs. For about the first decade of the 
CAA’s existence, most people instinctively thought that a “stationary source” could only refer to each 
individual smokestack or emission point at a regulated plant. But after some vacillation, in the 1980s EPA 
changed its interpretation, taking a more expansive view and endorsing use of the “bubble concept.” 
Under that approach, EPA allowed all emission points within an industrial operation to be treated as a 
single “stationary source,” such that increased emissions from one part of an industrial operation could be 
offset by decreased emissions in another part of the same unit so as to avoid triggering new source 
review. After the D.C. Circuit generated conflicting opinions, the Supreme Court endorsed EPA’s 
changed, expansive reading of the term “stationary source.” The case in which the Court reached that 
result was of course the famous Chevron case, which not only represents a mandate for judicial deference 
to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, but also specifically endorses a novel and 
broad reading of a key CAA term by EPA.58 The Court essentially found that the undefined simple term 
“stationary source” was enough to authorize a shift to what was a form of intra-source or intra-facility 
pollution trading. Chevron provides support by analogy for EPA’s similarly expansive reading of the term 
“system” of emission reduction under § 111. 
It is true that dictum in the Utility Air Regulatory Group seemed to interpret the Clean Air Act program at 
issue in that case to prohibit some beyond-the-fenceline measures.59 But the Court had no need to directly 
confront the question in that case, and it involved interpretation of a very different term (best available 
control technology) than the definition of a standard of performance for purposes of § 111(d). 
Section 111(d) language and definitional and section cross-references actually lend EPA’s beyond-the-
fenceline approach far more textual support than the mere term “stationary source” that was found 
adequate to justify the “bubble” concept upheld in Chevron. First, § 111(d) explicitly calls for a 
“procedure similar to that provided by section [110],” the SIP process for pollutants covered by the 
NAAQS. This cross-reference lacks further defining or clarifying language, but such definitional silence 
serves under Chevron to authorize a reasonable EPA interpretation. Moreover, Supreme Court precedents 
under § 110 have construed this provision as putting states in the driver’s seat, authorizing states to come 
up with plans to meet federal pollution levels (NAAQS), provided they meet federal minimum 
requirements established by the statute or EPA regulations. SIPs are effectively another trading-based 
regime, setting a virtual pollution bubble over a state Air Quality Control Region and obligating states to 
derive plans adequate to meet the NAAQS within each region within their borders. And, as further 
discussed elsewhere in this paper, § 110 was itself amended in 1990 to authorize implementation plans to 
include “economic incentives such as fees, marketable permits, or auctions of emissions rights.” The 
cross-reference to § 110 thus provides an explicit congressionally authorized textual hook for a 
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systemwide approach that allows states to choose among a wide array of regulatory strategies, including 
market-based strategies. 
Hence, between congressional deletion of “technological” in the definition of a standard of performance 
in § 111(a)(1), the use of the terms “system” and “plan” in connection with § 111(d) regulation, embrace 
of market-based regulation, and well-developed law about the breadth of state discretion in exercising the 
planning authority vested in them under § 110, a § 111(d) final rule that continues to rely on systemwide 
building blocks stands on strong textual footing.  
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Judicial	Review	of	the	Clean	Power	Plan:	A	Roadmap	
By Melissa Powers 
 
Opposition to the Clean Power Plan (CPP) has already spurred lawsuits,60 and many more will surely 
follow once EPA issues its final rule. Legal challenges to the CPP will almost certainly argue that EPA 
acted unconstitutionally, exceeded its statutory power, acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and violated 
procedural requirements when it promulgated the CPP. These legal arguments will invoke different 
judicial review and deference doctrines. This section briefly describes how courts will approach each type 
of legal challenge and explains how deference principles apply. 
 
Judicial Review under the Clean Air Act 
 
Any challenge to the CPP will arise under § 307(b) of the Clean 
Air Act (CAA). Section 307(b) requires parties to file challenges 
to nationally applicable regulations in the D.C. Circuit within 60 
days of EPA’s publication of a final regulation.61 The CPP is a 
nationally applicable regulation, so challenges to the CPP must 
be filed in the D.C. Circuit.62 Section 307 also establishes the 
criteria the court must employ when it evaluates the CPP. 
Specifically, § 307 states that a court may reverse any regulatory 
action it finds to be: 
 
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law; 
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or 
immunity; 
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or 
limitations, or short of statutory right; [or] 
(D) without observation of procedure required by 
law….63 
 
This language largely mirrors the judicial review provisions of 
the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA),64 and courts apply APA judicial review doctrines and 
case law to CAA regulatory challenges.65 Consistent with this approach, this section uses both CAA and 
APA cases to explain how judicial review will proceed. 
 
A party seeking to challenge the CPP must have satisfied the CAA’s exhaustion, or “raise it or waive it,” 
requirements.66 The CAA states: “Only an objection to a rule or procedure which was raised with 
reasonable specificity during the period for public comment ... may be raised during judicial review.”67 
The D.C. Circuit has generally interpreted this requirement in the CAA and other similar statutes rather 
strictly. If a party cannot demonstrate that it or another party squarely presented an issue to EPA, the party 
likely will not be able to litigate the issue in court.68 Although the CAA has narrow exceptions to this 
exhaustion requirement,69 parties have only rarely succeeded in demonstrating they qualified for the 
exceptions. Thus, it seems unlikely that parties could successfully raise new legal arguments that differ 
substantially from the legal issues that were raised in public comments and are the focus of other parts of 
this paper.  
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Judicial Review of Claims Alleging the Clean Power Plan is Unconstitutional 
 
As discussed in William Buzbee and Robert Glicksman’s article elsewhere in this paper, parties have 
already challenged the constitutionality of the proposed CPP, and they will undoubtedly raise the same 
constitutional arguments once EPA issues its final rule. In reviewing the CPP’s constitutional legality, the 
D.C. Circuit will engage in de novo review, meaning that EPA’s views about the constitutionality of the 
CPP are by and large irrelevant in this inquiry.70 
 
Review of Claims Alleging EPA Exceeded its Statutory Authority 
 
Parties will also argue (and, indeed, have already argued) that the CPP is illegal because EPA does not 
have statutory authority either to regulate power plants under § 111(d) at all or because EPA’s “beyond-
the-fenceline” approach exceeds EPA’s statutory authority. In both of these challenges, opponents to the 
CPP will argue that the CAA clearly prohibits EPA’s conduct. EPA will argue either that the CAA clearly 
allows EPA’s actions, or that the CAA is unclear on the matter and that the court should therefore defer to 
EPA’s interpretation of the statute. To resolve whether EPA has acted within its statutory authority, the 
court will employ the Chevron two-step approach to statutory review.71 
 
Step	One	
 
At step one, a court must look at the relevant statutory text to determine whether it is clear. To determine 
if the statute has a clear meaning, the starting point is the language of the statute itself.72 Courts frequently 
turn to external sources, such as dictionaries, to determine if a particular word or phrase has a specific 
meaning.73 Courts also often invoke canons of construction, which are judicial doctrines governing 
statutory interpretation, to determine if a statute has a clear meaning.74 Common canons of construction 
include ejusdem generis — a doctrine that says specific words in a list may help define a more general 
word (e.g., if a list includes pigs, cows, chickens, and other farm animals, humans would probably not be 
included even though they might live on a farm and be in the animal kingdom)75 — and expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius — a doctrine that says that if a statute expressly excludes certain things, other 
exceptions should not be read into the law.76 Finally, courts have adopted several general rules based on 
common word meanings to govern interpretation. For example, “any” generally signals congressional 
intent to be expansive,77 and “shall” is usually a mandatory term,78 while “may” is generally permissive.79 
In short, the words of the statute matter first and foremost in statutory construction. 
 
Of course, words alone rarely offer conclusive meaning, so courts will turn to other sources to divine a 
statute’s meaning. The context and structure of the relevant statutory term are commonly used to guide 
judicial review.80 For example, if a statute states an agency “shall” act, but then immediately conditions 
the agency’s actions on other permissive factors, “shall” would no longer signal mandatory action. 
Similarly, if other parts of a statute use a disputed term in a manner that clarifies congressional intent, 
courts will look at other parts of the statute to define the contested language.81 Courts may also look at 
other laws that use the same language to understand the meaning of a contested term.82 Finally, although 
some jurists oppose this approach, courts will look at other indicia of congressional intent, including the 
contested statute’s legislative history.83 
 
Ultimately, at the end of step one, a court will determine if the statute is clear. If it is, “that is the end of 
the matter,”84 and the court will then evaluate if the agency’s interpretation conforms to the statute’s clear 
requirements. If the court finds the agency interpretation is consistent with the statute, the court will 
uphold the agency interpretation. If the court finds the agency has acted inconsistently with the statute, the 
court will either vacate or remand the agency action or interpretation.85 If the court vacates the agency 
action, it no longer has any legal force or effect. In contrast, if the court remands the agency action 
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without vacatur, the action will remain in effect until the agency revises the action. In Clean Air Act 
challenges, the D.C. Circuit has at times agreed to remand-only remedies where vacatur would have 
serious adverse public health and environmental consequences.86 
 
Step	Two		
 
If a court determines that a statute is either silent or ambiguous regarding a particular issue, it proceeds to 
Chevron step two. Under step two, a court will evaluate whether an agency’s interpretation is permissible 
or reasonable under the statutory scheme.87 Recently, the Supreme Court explained that at step two, a 
court should not overturn an agency's interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute “unless it is arbitrary and capricious in 
substance or manifestly contrary to the statute.”88 Application 
of this test has created some confusion because it is not clear 
how the Court distinguishes interpretations that are “arbitrary 
and capricious in substance” from those that are “manifestly 
contrary to the statute.” Regardless, the Supreme Court has 
made clear that the agency’s interpretation should receive 
strong deference from the judiciary at step two.89 If the 
agency’s interpretation is consistent with the underlying 
purposes of the statute, the court should uphold that 
interpretation, even if the court believes an alternative 
interpretation is better than the one offered by the agency.90  
 
The process of applying Chevron step two may seem 
redundant to step one analysis, because a court will often 
again attempt to divine a statute’s purpose and meaning to 
determine if an agency’s interpretation of a statute is 
permissible. Indeed, some scholars have argued that statutory 
interpretation really involves a single step, and that agency 
interpretations should be found impermissible only when they 
flatly conflict with Congress’s clearly stated intent.91 Others, 
however, note that ambiguous statutory terms can nonetheless 
have a limited range of meanings, and while a number of 
agency interpretations may be reasonable, some will not.92 In 
practice, if a court concludes that a statute is ambiguous, an 
agency’s interpretation will almost always be upheld at step 
two,93 unless the interpretation could in no way fit within the 
statutory scheme. For example, in Whitman v. American 
Trucking Association, the Supreme Court invalidated EPA’s 
interpretation of an ambiguous part of the CAA that would have rendered “carefully designed restrictions 
on EPA’s discretion utterly nugatory.”94 In contrast, in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., the Court 
upheld EPA’s consideration of costs in setting Clean Water Act effluent limitations guidelines reflecting 
the “best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact,” noting that the 
consideration of costs did not clearly conflict with the statutory structure or purpose.95 These cases 
illustrate the typical deferential approach courts take to step two review: Absent a glaring inconsistency 
between an agency’s interpretation and a statute’s intent, structure, or purpose, courts will typically 
uphold agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.  
 
This deference, moreover, is available even if an agency’s interpretation of a statute has changed over 
time or even if the agency interprets similar terms differently within the same statute. The Supreme Court 
has rejected the argument that an agency should necessarily receive less deference for a revised 
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interpretation of the statute, so long as the agency explains its reasons for the change.96 The Supreme 
Court has also stated that agencies may offer differing interpretations of similar terms to further 
congressional intent. For example, in American Paper Institute v. American Electric Power Service, the 
Supreme Court upheld the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s decision to set different rates for 
power sales to electric utilities than for sales from electric utilities, even though the statute required both 
sets of rates to be “just and reasonable” and “in the public interest.”97 In sum, so long as an agency’s 
interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term is “permissible,” and thus not precluded by the statute’s 
language, structure, or purpose, courts will generally uphold the agency’s interpretation. 
 
Judicial	Review	of	Claims	Alleging	EPA	Acted	Arbitrarily	and	Capriciously	
 
When EPA issues its final regulation, parties will likely also allege that EPA has acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in adopting the specific rule it did. Unlike Chevron review, which focuses on whether an 
agency has correctly interpreted a statute, arbitrary and capricious review considers whether an agency 
has properly implemented the statute. Opponents to the CPP have already raised a host of concerns about 
the proposed rule’s impact on electricity prices and electricity system reliability, the feasibility of 
implementing the building blocks, and the rule’s benefits versus costs. If the final CPP adopts the 
structure of the proposed rule, opponents will convert these arguments into a legal claim that the CPP is 
arbitrary and capricious.  
 
In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, Inc. v. State Farm,98 the Supreme Court explained that 
arbitrary and capricious review examines whether an agency “has articulated a satisfactory outline for its 
action” and drawn a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.”99 Although 
arbitrary and capricious review is supposed to be narrow and deferential to agency decisions, an agency 
action would be arbitrary and capricious: 
 
if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely 
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its 
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it 
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.100 
 
Under statutes like the CAA, which depend heavily on scientific and policy judgments, courts are 
especially deferential to agency decisions.101 EPA has lost CAA challenges under the arbitrary and 
capricious standard where evidence in the record contradicted EPA’s conclusions,102 where EPA failed to 
follow its own guidelines or regulations,103 and where EPA reversed its prior course of conduct without 
explanation.104 In most instances, however, EPA actions have survived arbitrary and capricious review, 
even when they employed innovative approaches to regulation.105 These outcomes illustrate the role that 
deference will play in any evaluation of the CPP. 
 
Judicial	Review	of	Claims	Alleging	EPA	Violated	Procedural	Requirements	
 
Finally, some parties have suggested that they will sue EPA for violating the procedural requirements of 
the CAA by failing to fully consider comments filed in opposition to the proposed CPP. The CAA 
includes detailed requirements for EPA to follow when it proposes and finalizes regulations.106 When 
EPA issues a proposed rule, it must include a statement of basis and purpose, summarize the factual data 
on which the proposed rule is based, summarize the methodology the agency used in obtaining and 
analyzing data, and provide the agency’s major legal interpretations and policy considerations underlying 
the proposal.107 The final rule must similarly include a statement of basis and purpose, as well as an 
explanation of any changes from draft to final rule and a response to submitted comments and data.108 So 
long as EPA adheres to these requirements, it will likely survive procedural challenges. Thus, even if the 
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final CPP mirrors EPA’s initial proposal, challenges alleging that the notice-and-comment process was a 
sham would likely fail. Similarly, even if EPA substantially alters the CPP in its final form, this would 
likely not violate the CAA’s procedural requirements so long as the changes were a logical outgrowth of 
the notice-and-comment process.109 
 
In sum, EPA will face a number of different legal challenges when it issues the final CPP. The standard of 
review will depend upon the specific challenges raised. The reviewing court will review pure legal claims 
(i.e., whether the CPP is constitutional and whether the CAA’s meaning is clear) under a de novo standard 
in which EPA’s views will receive no deference. In reviewing other claims, the court will typically defer 
to EPA. These background principles of judicial review will shape how the court responds to the legal and 
policy issues discussed in the remainder of this paper. 
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Section	III:	Implications	for	the	Energy	Sector	
One thing opponents and proponents agree on is that the Clean Power Plan will have a significant impact 
on the U.S. energy sector, including how it is governed, whether and how industry will adapt to the 
changing regulatory landscape, the reliability of electricity under the CPP, and the extent to which states 
and utilities can and should collaborate across state borders.  
In this section, CPR Member Scholars address these issues. 
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State	Agency	Coordination,	Policy	Options,	and	Jurisdictional	
Considerations	
By Emily Hammond 
As states consider their options for CPP compliance, they will need to pay particular attention to two 
governance issues: (1) coordination between state public utility commissions (PUCs) and state 
environmental agencies; and (2) the preemption implications of states’ incentive-design choices, which 
may vary depending on whether states have restructured their retail electricity markets.  
Inter‐Agency	Coordination	
First, a challenge for energy policy in the United States is that energy laws have evolved in a piecemeal 
fashion, with little unified integration of energy and environmental concerns.110 As a result, it has always 
been critical that energy and environmental agencies coordinate to help smooth the divide.111 The federal 
experience offers lessons for states facing new issues of interagency coordination. At the federal level, 
examples of effective interagency coordination have been well documented, as have the benefits of such 
coordination.112 Indeed, careful coordination can increase the likelihood of broad stakeholder support 
while decreasing the agencies’ vulnerability to judicial remands.113 But when agencies fail to coordinate 
their efforts, they risk uninformed decision-making as well as judicial remands.114  
Consider, for example, the recent D.C. Circuit decision in Delaware Dep’t of Natural Resources & 
Environmental Control v. EPA.115 At issue was EPA’s Clean Air Act rule aimed at the use of backup 
generators, which typically burn diesel fuel and emit hazardous air pollutants, among others.116 In its rule, 
EPA permitted backup generators to run without pollution controls for the purpose of providing up to 100 
hours per year of demand response.117 In support of its 100-hour provision, which EPA had increased 
significantly from 15 hours in a prior rule, EPA emphasized the reliability needs of the bulk power 
system.118 But when it responded to critiques of how the rule would work within the confines of that 
system, the agency repeatedly stated that such issues were better addressed to the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC).119 That is, EPA relied on a rationale outside its expertise, without 
having obtained input from the agency that did have the applicable expertise. In holding the rationale 
arbitrary and capricious, the court emphasized that EPA should seek FERC’s input on remand.120 
Coordination between EPA and FERC will likewise be necessary during implementation of the CPP — 
and it is a matter that has attracted significant attention.121  
But having used the federal example to illustrate the importance of agency coordination generally, I now 
turn briefly to the corresponding importance of agency coordination at the state level. Similar to the 
federal split of authority, environmental and electricity considerations have generally been divided 
between two agencies at the state level. Typically, state environmental agencies implement the CAA, 
while state public utility commissions (PUCs) have authority over electricity distribution at the retail 
level.122 This authority may also extend to setting retail rates or overseeing restructured retail markets. 
Thus, as states work to implement the CPP framework, they will need to ensure that the relevant state-
level agencies have both the authority and the political will to coordinate with one another to ensure 
compliance with the CAA, electricity reliability over the distribution network, and consumer protection 
with respect to electricity delivery.123 
Thus far, there has been some progress in state-level agency coordination.124 Much of it has been 
attributed to the leadership of various national organizations,125 which have themselves modeled 
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coordination, producing a wealth of information as well. For example, the National Association of State 
Energy Officials (NASEO) has partnered with the National Association of Regulatory Utility 
Commissioners (NARUC) and the National Association of Clean Air Agencies (NACAA) to form the 
“3N” group.126 3N has provided numerous resources addressing state compliance from the perspective of 
multiple state regulatory bodies, and has facilitated ongoing dialogue between them.127  
State	Electricity	Restructuring	Status	and	Preemption	
A second issue for states’ consideration is how their electricity restructuring status and policy choices 
interact with the Federal Power Act’s preemptive scope.128 By operation of the Supremacy Clause, the 
Federal Power Act can limit states’ ability to regulate matters of wholesale electricity sales.129 This 
distinction — that FERC regulates wholesale while states regulate retail — is deceptive in its apparent 
simplicity.130 Moreover, it has come under increasing pressure as states seek ways to promote their 
electricity fuel preferences, notwithstanding wholesale market dysfunctions. For example, when 
Maryland and New Jersey each attempted to incentivize new natural gas construction by providing 
subsidies that compensated such generation for perceived deficiencies in the capacity markets, federal 
courts held that those efforts were preempted.131 The courts reasoned that these subsidies would distort 
prices in the wholesale markets; moreover, by restructuring their retail markets, the states had thrown in 
their “lot with the federal interstate markets” and relinquished their former regulatory autonomy.132  
It is unclear why a state’s restructuring status should matter for the issues presented in the cases described 
above. But provided the cases stand — petitions for certiorari have been filed in both — they may provide 
additional reasons for pause in restructured states that view wholesale market dysfunctions as a challenge 
to CPP compliance. For instance, many states recognize the reliability and environmental benefits 
provided by nuclear power, and view nuclear as an important part of CPP compliance.133 But dysfunctions 
in the wholesale markets have made it difficult for nuclear power to stay competitive because reliability 
and environmental benefits are not directly valued in those markets.134 States, especially restructured 
ones, may need to avoid remedies that directly attempt to compensate for wholesale market failures.135 
Other policy options, like carefully constructed low-carbon portfolio standards, may be less susceptible to 
challenges like those described here. 
Recommendations	
 To ensure a reliable, green electricity system under the CPP, state environmental agencies, which 
have primary authority for CPP compliance, will need to carefully coordinate with state utility 
commissions, which have primary authority over electricity generation and delivery. 
 In formulating policy options for CPP compliance, preemption concerns suggest that states 
should exercise caution if they wish to address wholesale electricity market dysfunctions that 
under-incentivize investment in reliable, low-carbon electricity. 
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It is unsurprising, then, that some 
voices in the electric industry do 
not embrace the CPP, arguing that 
the environmental requirements 
are too costly. The industry puts 
forward two basic arguments. First, 
it maintains that as a result of the 
availability of non‐utility electricity, 
particularly from distributed 
energy resources (DER) and 
efficiency requirements, it will soon 
be in the throes of a “death spiral,” 
and that the CPP’s additional 
regulations only add to their 
financial burdens. Second, they 
assert that further regulations, 
particularly those addressing 
carbon emissions, threaten the 
reliability of the entire electric 
system, an issue discussed briefly 
here and addressed in more detail 
in another section of this report. 
Neither argument is sound. 
The	Clean	Power	Plan	and	the	Electricity	Industry	
By Joseph P. Tomain 
The Clean Power Plan (CPP) is a watershed proposal for the U.S. electricity industry and its regulation 
because it begins to align energy and environmental regulation in unprecedented ways. Historically, 
energy and the environment have been regulated by separate legal regimes devised by separate agencies 
with divergent missions. Over the years, the utility industry has 
grown familiar with its energy regulators, but less familiar 
with environmental regulators. The CPP changes that 
arrangement. As an environmental regulation emanating from 
EPA, it is directed toward reducing carbon emissions from 
existing electric utilities.  
Electric utilities have been, and continue to be, regulated by 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and state Public 
Utility Commissions (PUCs) through price controls intended 
to set rates that reward utilities for their prudent investments 
and that are just and reasonable for consumers. The CPP, by 
imposing a set of environmental regulations on utilities, 
presents a particular challenge to them. More specifically, 
utilities, and their state regulators, must devise a plan for 
emissions reductions by using building blocks that will have 
the direct effect of changing the resources used by utilities to 
generate electricity and may well affect their income streams. 
Briefly, utilities that are heavily reliant on coal must look for 
other energy resources for power generation, such as wind 
and solar power. Also, to the extent that a state 
implementation plan encourages the use of energy efficiency, 
utilities face the risk of lost revenues due to reduced 
electricity sales. 
It is unsurprising, then, that some voices in the electric 
industry do not embrace the CPP, arguing that the 
environmental requirements are too costly. The industry puts 
forward two basic arguments. First, it maintains that as a 
result of the availability of non-utility electricity, particularly 
from distributed energy resources (DER) and efficiency 
requirements, it will soon be in the throes of a “death spiral,”136 and that the CPP’s additional regulations 
only add to their financial burdens. Second, they assert that further regulations, particularly those 
addressing carbon emissions, threaten the reliability of the entire electric system,137 an issue discussed 
briefly here and addressed in more detail in another section of this report. 
Neither argument is sound. The electric utility industry is not heading into a CPP-induced death spiral for 
two reasons.138 First, at present, less than 2 percent of electricity is provided by DER.139 Consequently, 
claims of financial exigency are overstated. Second, DER activities precede the CPP and are being 
addressed by the industry independently of the prosed rule. Claims about reliability, likewise, are not 
based on solid evidence or fact and, are likewise overstated.140 Instead of retarding economic growth, the 
The	Clean	Power	Plan:	Issues	to	Watch	 	 	 Page	|	34		
As the electric utility industry 
confronts the challenges posed by 
the CPP, it must be recognized that 
for four or more decades the electric 
industry has proven its resilience; it 
has faced several major challenges 
and, together with supporting 
regulations, has weathered each of 
them. 
CPP presents opportunities for business and regulatory innovation as traditionally structured utilities 
reorient their business practices.  
As the electric utility industry confronts the challenges posed by the CPP, it must be recognized that for 
four or more decades the electric industry has proven its resilience; it has faced several major challenges 
and, has weathered each of them. Indeed, history indicates that industry resilience, combined with a 
regulatory regime that recognizes the central importance of reliable and affordable electricity and adjusts 
regulatory requirements as needed, will meet CPP requirements.  
The U.S. electric industry has been heavily price regulated for over a century under a regulatory regime 
that encouraged capital investment and expansion. As long as the country was growing and as long as a 
national infrastructure was needed, such investments had two positive effects. First, electricity played a 
pivotal role in the country’s economic expansion and, second, utilities continued to realize economies of 
scale thus keeping electricity affordable. In the last third of the 20th century, however, electricity prices 
began to rise and the regulation of the industry became more complicated and more contentious.  
Today, utilities face flattening demand, the need for investment in grid improvements, increased 
competition particularly from DER, regulatory requirements for renewable resources, energy efficiency, 
and, now with the CPP, carbon emissions reductions. Each of these drivers pressure utilities to reform 
their business models and pressure regulators to support those changes as utilities face reduced sales and 
lower revenues together with new regulatory obligations. The utility of the future will need to transform 
itself from a firm that sold only electricity to an energy firm that provides a variety of products and 
services.141 While utilities have argued against the CPP, utilities have successfully responded to prior 
challenges and have been full participants in the country’s 
transition to a clean energy economy, a transition that has 
been developing for decades prior to the CPP.142  
Following the post-war period of economic expansion, the 
electric industry has faced four notable challenges of 
varying degrees of intensity and has met them all.143 First, 
during the mid-1960s through the mid-1970s, the industry 
appeared to reach the end of its economies of scale. 
However, it continued to make capital investments, which, 
in turn, contributed to excess capacity and then to higher-
priced electricity. Second, from the mid-1970s well into the 
1980s, the nuclear industry collapsed with significant 
repercussions for both shareholders and ratepayers.144 Third, during the late 1980s through the 1990s, 
heeding the general deregulatory mood in Washington, policy-makers attempted to deregulate wholesale 
and retail electricity sales. Those deregulatory efforts, however, were only partially successful for 
wholesale sales and much less so for retail sales. Finally, since the turn of the 20th century, regulators 
continue their efforts to restructure the industry by increasing access to the grid by new non-utility 
electricity providers.  
For decades now, the electric industry and its state regulators have been actively engaged with meeting 
the emerging energy transition. Indeed, the CPP studied state clean energy efforts such as demand-side 
management, renewable portfolio standards, market-based emission limits and utility planning and 
incorporated them into its building blocks.145 Consequently, the plan encourages utilities to continue 
experimenting with new business models, and regulators are likewise encouraged to experiment with new 
rate designs and other regulations and incentives.  
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Most significantly, the clean energy efforts already being undertaken by the industry and its regulators are 
consistent with the CPP. For example, energy policymakers in New York and Minnesota have taken the 
lead in transforming the regulation of the industry and, therefore, transforming the industry itself. In New 
York, the Public Service Commission has adopted an ambitious regulatory policy framework known as 
Reforming the Energy Vision (REV) directed at reforming how electricity is produced, distributed, 
consumed, regulated, and priced.146 Under the plan, utilities are encouraged to explore the use of micro-
grids, energy efficiency, energy storage, and demand response as well as help create markets for new 
energy technologies. The REV also envisions the organization of investor-owned utilities (IOUs) and a 
municipal electricity provider to serve as retail dispatchers similar to regional reliability organizations. 
The idea, then, behind this part of the REV is to more tightly organize the distribution system precisely to 
provide greater assurance for reliability. Most significantly, the plan is designed so that ratepayers are not 
saddled with significant transition or energy costs.147 
In Minnesota, a collaborative group of utilities, consumers, business, and government leaders as well as 
academicians interested in reforming the electric system generated a list of recommendations to take 
advantage of the transforming energy economy. The idea behind the Minnesota plan is to move away 
from the traditional utility business model toward one that provides increased consumer choice. Similarly, 
the plan is to move away from a system that rewards capital expenditures in favor of one that rewards 
performance and satisfies customer preferences for energy efficiency, reliability, affordability, and 
emissions reductions.148  
Other states are active as well. Hawaii’s Clean Energy Initiative has a goal of achieving 70 percent clean 
energy by 2030 with 30 percent from efficiency measures and 40 percent from renewable resources.149 
Similarly, the California Clean Energy Future joins system operators and other state agencies to promote 
innovation and green job creation through investments in transmission, efficiency, the smart grid, and 
renewable resources.150 
Utilities themselves are also actively pursuing new business strategies through investing in distributed 
generation, energy efficiency, and energy storage.151 Additionally, industry actors are looking at 
opportunities for consolidation, reducing operating costs, exploring new markets to further growth, and 
determining how to leverage low carbon resources to provide adequate electricity.152 However, as 
regulated entities, utilities alone cannot undertake a successful transition without regulatory assistance 
and support from PUCs. 
Because utilities have been rewarded for capital expansion, they have had no incentive to reduce 
operating costs, open transmission and distribution to other users, or to invest in new technologies. In 
fact, PUCs, through ratemaking, have encouraged utilities to continue to invest and expand. Thus, PUCs 
play a central role in providing economic incentives for utility behavior and performance. Consequently, 
regulators must acknowledge the direction of the CPP, and they must realize that if the electric system is 
going to be transformed by opening it up to more competition and a greater diversity of resources, rate 
designs that facilitate that transformation are necessary.  
New rate designs are available, and promising methods include decoupling,153 performance-based rates, 
long-term energy plans, and earnings sharing mechanisms. The core idea behind such reforms is to move 
away from rates that encourage consumption to rates that encourage utilities to improve performance 
while reducing demand.154 These new regulatory models can assist utility planning and investment, satisfy 
customer expectations, and promote new technologies155 and markets even during a period of low demand 
and greater competition from efficiency measures and distributed resources.156  
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More specifically, through innovative rate designs, regulators can encourage: (1) business innovation; (2) 
investments in renewable resources and energy efficiency; and, (3) grid improvements and upgrades. 
Further, utilities, faced by the several challenges already noted, are finding that compliance with the 
energy efficiency and renewable energy building blocks of the CPP is becoming increasingly 
economical.157 Consequently, utility resistance to the CPP appears more like resistance to change in 
general rather than to the CPP in particular. More particularly, the United States is moving toward a clean 
energy economy, and utilities and their regulators have been moving along with it. Indeed, the CPP does 
not run counter to those transformations; rather, it is consistent with them. 
Recommendation	
 Energy regulators should follow the lead of states such as New York and Minnesota and 
reevaluate electricity regulation with the goal of adopting rate designs that enable the electricity 
industry to comply with the CPP by encouraging renewable resources and energy efficiency 
reliably and affordably while facilitating a transition to a fully clean energy system. 
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Reliability	and	the	Clean	Power	Plan158 
By Joseph P. Tomain 
Industry claims that meeting the Clean Power Plan’s (CPP) carbon reduction targets will compromise the 
reliability of the U.S. electricity sector. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), an 
entity designated by the Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC) to provide congressionally 
required reliability assessments, has conducted a study assessing the reliability issues posed by the 
CPP.159 In its initial study, published in November 2014, NERC identified several reliability issues 
including: (1) the adequacy of clean energy replacements for fossil fuel plant retirements; (2) whether 
EPA’s assessment of potential heat rate improvements under Building Block 1 is achievable; (3) the need 
for transportation investments in natural gas pipelines and for electricity transmission lines (particularly to 
connect variable resources to the grid); (4) the adequacy of EPA’s assessment of the penetration of 
renewable resources for electricity generation; (5) the effects of increased use of distributed energy 
resources (DER) on reliability; (6) whether EPA’s estimates of the increased use of energy efficiency will 
meet the growth in electricity demand; (7) the effect of the CPP on reliability services such as load 
balancing and voltage and frequency support; and (8) whether the CPP allows enough time for states to 
comply.160 Each issue is significant and will be addressed in turn. 
(1) Fossil Plant Retirements. Utilities have been retiring coal plants prior to the CPP for three key 
reasons: the aging of the coal fleet; environmental regulations such as mercury air toxics 
standards; and lower natural gas prices, which make natural gas electricity generation cheaper 
than coal generation. The environmental regulations under the CPP may contribute to retirements 
to some extent because states can achieve the emission-rate targets most easily by retiring high-
emitting coal-fired power plants. However, plant retirements should not affect reliability. 
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), in 2015 approximately 16 
gigawatts (GW) of generation will be lost of which 12.9 GW are from retiring coal plants. The 
EIA reports that lost generation will be more than replaced by 20 GW of new generation 
including wind (9.8 GW), natural gas (6.3 GW), and solar power (2.2 GW).161 Looking forward 
to additional retirements from the CPP, the trend is likely to continue: New generation from 
renewable resources and natural gas, plus improved efficiency, are likely to allay reliability 
concerns. 
(2) Heat Rate Improvements. The CPP suggests that heat rate improvements, i.e. efficiency 
improvements in plants, can be improved by 6 percent. NERC notes that a 6-percent heat rate 
improvement may be difficult to achieve. However, NERC addressed individual plant-level heat 
rate improvements rather than fleet-level heat rate improvements, which are likely to improve due 
to retirements of the least efficient plants. In other words, under the CPP, the 6-percent heat rate 
improvement is a statewide estimate not an estimate per plant. The CPP is flexible and does not 
require upgrades at each plant. Thus, as utilities retire less efficient coal plants and rely on more 
efficient coal plants, fleet-wide heat rate improvements are likely. Additionally, greater 
cogeneration and waste heat recovery can contribute to heat rate improvements.162 
(3) Transmission Planning and Investment. As old generation plants retire and new ones are 
constructed, new and/or upgraded transmission facilities will be needed to interconnect new 
generation, particularly variable generation from solar and wind. Additionally, as natural gas 
plays a larger role in electricity generation, gas pipelines will be needed. One significant 
challenge is that transmission line siting authority has been divided between state and federal 
governments, which presents two problems. First, acquiring the necessary approvals and 
construction can take years, and, second, not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) resistance is not 
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The CPP may contribute to plant 
retirements to some extent 
because states can achieve the 
emission‐rate targets most easily 
by retiring high‐emitting coal‐fired 
power plants. However, plant 
retirements should not affect 
reliability. According to the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, 
in 2015 approximately 16 
gigawatts (GW) of generation will 
be lost of which 12.9 GW are from 
retiring coal plants. The EIA reports 
that lost generation will be more 
than replaced by 20 GW of new 
generation including wind (9.8 
GW), natural gas (6.3 GW), and 
solar power (2.2 GW). 
unknown.163 Nevertheless, there are promising signs. First, increased penetration of renewable 
generation from variable resources has already created a strong impetus for new transmission 
lines.164 Second, the electric industry and its state regulators are engaged in ongoing transmission 
planning processes that will continue without regard to the CPP. Third, because natural gas, 
unlike electricity, can be stored, utilities can store natural gas in advance to reduce reliability risks 
during periods of high use.  
(4) Penetration of Renewable Resources. NERC notes that renewable portfolio standards (RPS) 
programs may not achieve the goals that EPA 
suggests. It is true that the states have uneven records 
in setting and achieving RPS goals. However, that 
potential deficit could be offset by states whose RPS 
targets already exceed EPA estimates. Further, as 
costs for renewable resources decline, two positive 
consequences are emerging. First, penetration levels 
of renewable resources are increasing. Second, 
because of that increase, independent transmission 
companies, known as merchant transmission firms, 
are entering the transmission market to connect 
renewable energy to the grid. Significantly, in its 
most recent report, the EIA notes that renewable 
electricity will meet much of the growth in electricity 
demand. It is projected that renewable electricity 
generation will increase by 72 percent from 2013 to 
2040 and will account for more than one-third of new 
generation.165 
(5) Increased Use of Distributed Energy Resources 
(DER). Consumers are beginning to enjoy greater 
control over their energy consumption. Distributed 
resources such as rooftop solar, heat pumps, micro-
grids, and even programmable thermostats and 
appliances provide consumers with information with which they can shape consumption choices. 
Utilities have expressed concern about the expansion of DER because increased penetration may 
reduce their retail sales. However, forward thinking electricity associations, such as the Electric 
Power Research Institute, are proactively engaged in incorporating DER into their generation 
mix.166 As discussed in the section on the CPP’s impacts on the electricity industry, state utility 
regulators can mitigate this concern through adjustments in state rate regulations. Reduced sales, 
moreover, must not be confused with reliability. Increased use of DER reduces stress on the grid, 
and, therefore, increases reliability. 
(6) Energy Efficiency and Demand Growth. NERC points out that EPA’s estimates of the growth in 
energy efficiency may not keep up with demand for electricity. However, the EIA projects that 
energy consumption will be at the near-zero growth rate of 0.3 percent per year from 2013 
through 2040.167 Further, states are experimenting with and recognize potential savings through 
their energy efficiency programs. Moreover, new technologies reduce cost to consumers, and 
some states are developing best practices that can be adopted by other states. In addition, through 
the use of building codes, appliance standards, and fuel economy standards, energy efficiency 
gains are being made. Finally, energy efficiency programs that rely on tradable energy credits can 
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Over the last decades, reliability 
issues have been addressed 
through regional organizational 
arrangements and the CPP draws 
on those experiences. Because 
different states in different regions 
of the country have different 
resource mixes and different 
generation fleets, regional 
arrangements can enhance 
reliability, create competitive 
wholesale energy markets, and 
improve transmission while 
reducing carbon emissions. 
Regardless, new gas‐fired plants, 
renewable resources, energy 
storage, and efficiency and 
demand response resources are all 
available to meet the CPP targets 
without threatening reliability. 
be improved through multistate and regional programs, which create more sustainable and fluid 
energy efficiency markets. Thus, energy efficiency measures appear to be keeping up with 
demand, without a gap that would raise reliability concerns. 
(7) Reliability Services. Because electricity cannot be stored at the necessary scale, supply and 
demand must be managed through a process known as load balancing. Similarly, voltage levels 
must be maintained, otherwise, grid disruption results. Reliability services are used to achieve 
load-balancing and maintain voltage levels. At this point, however, there are no large-scale 
commercial electricity storage solutions to help maintain and balance load, although storage 
options are starting to enter the market.168 Adding variable resources, such as wind and solar, to 
the electricity resource mix does pose challenges to both 
load-balancing and voltage stability. Nevertheless, 
increased energy production from multiple sources, 
including variable resources, has thus far not imposed 
reliability problems. Many states, for example, have 
RPS mandates that exceed those suggested by the CPP 
and have not encountered reliability problems. As noted 
above, the industry and its regulators have been engaged 
in ongoing reliability planning for decades. Further, the 
industry has experienced multiple changes over its 
history while adequately managing load-balancing and 
maintaining voltage stability.169 
(8) Timing for Compliance. NERC, as well as other industry 
commentators such as the Edison Electric Institute,170 
suggest that the compliance window is short and that 
states should have more time to comply to ensure 
reliability. Currently, individual state plans are to be 
submitted June 2017, multistate plans are to be 
submitted in June 2018, and the compliance period 
begins 2020. However, a study by the Brattle Group 
notes that efforts to transition to a clean energy economy 
are occurring regardless of the CPP and, therefore, 
timing does not present a material issue. The study 
states: “[W]e find that the combination of the ongoing 
transformation of the power sector, the steps already 
taken by system operators, the large and expanding set of technological and operational tools 
available, and the flexibility under the CPP are likely sufficient to ensure that compliance with the 
CPP can be planned by states in ways that will not materially affect reliability.”171 Another study 
similarly concludes that “[t]he evidence does not support the argument that the proposed CPP will 
result in a general and unavoidable decline in reliability.... [W]e believe resource planners and 
markets will have sufficient time and resources to respond to a realistic projection of system 
redispatch and facility retirements.”172  
Additionally, many of the commenters who argued that there is insufficient time for compliance have 
urged FERC to provide relief either in terms of a “reliability safety valve” or a “reliability assurance 
mechanism.” The core idea is simple enough: industry and its regulators want more time. The details of 
those mechanisms, however, are unspecified. There is cause for skepticism. One study indicates that 
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“[m]any of these mechanisms to address ‘reliability’ are either too lenient, constituting an escape clause 
from compliance, or are investment cost avoidance measures masquerading as reliability protections.”173  
A number of factors undercut the criticism that the states cannot meet the scheduled timetable. First, 
many organizations are putting together toolkits to help facilitate planning.174 Second, the industry has 
regularly and successfully addressed reliability issues through ongoing planning processes, particularly 
through regional organizations. Third, the flexibility of the CPP allows for a variety of responses and 
resource mixes to allow time to adequately manage plant retirements as well as the integration of variable 
resources and energy efficiency, all while maintaining reliability.175 
Conclusion	
Reliability is absolutely essential for the functioning of the electric system. Electricity, as we all know, 
must be available at the flip of a switch. The CPP is cognizant of reliability issues, and through EPA’s 
communications with states and utilities, its study of existing technologies and regulations, the CPP’s 
flexibility in terms of satisfying emissions reduction targets, and its encouragement of multi-state 
planning, reliability is fully addressed. Over the last decades, reliability issues have been addressed 
through regional organizational arrangements and the CPP draws on those experiences. Because different 
states in different regions of the country have different resource mixes and different generation fleets, 
regional arrangements can enhance reliability, create competitive wholesale energy markets, and improve 
transmission while reducing carbon emissions.176 Regardless, new gas-fired plants, renewable resources, 
energy storage, and efficiency and demand response resources are all available to meet the CPP targets 
without threatening reliability.177 
As a number of commentators have stated: (1) reliability assessments and processes are largely in place; 
(2) reliability assessments are favorable for higher penetrations of renewable energy and more coal plant 
retirements; (3) transmission improvements have been highly effective in bringing renewable energy to 
market; and, (4) improved use of new and existing infrastructure is a valuable way to lower consumer 
costs while complying with the CPP.178 In short, industry and its regulators have a long history of 
successfully planning and assessing reliability. Such activities will continue with or without the CPP 
because of the importance of electricity to our economy and to our citizens. Reliability is a critical 
concern, but history demonstrates that industry and its regulators can address these issues and the CPP 
does not present reliability obstacles.179 
Recommendation:		
 States and utilities should continue planning processes and work with available regional 
transmission organizations (RTOs) and Independent system operators (ISOs) to develop regional 
solutions to address any reliability issues that might emerge. 
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The CPP presents the states with a 
suite of suggested energy 
resources, technologies, and 
regulatory innovations that will 
assist them in reducing carbon 
emissions from existing generating 
plants. The flexibility of the CPP is a 
necessary element because 
different states have different 
resource mixes and different 
electricity generation fleets. 
Consequently, states will craft 
either individual or multi‐state 
plans to satisfy CPP requirements. 
The	Clean	Power	Plan	and	Clean	Energy	Policy	
By Joseph P. Tomain 
 
The United States has been experiencing a clean energy transition. For the most part, this transition is 
being driven by individual states and by the private sector through clean energy investments.180 The 
federal government has declined to take a lead role to date, but with EPA’s coming release of the Clean 
Power Plan (CPP), that is, at last, changing. The CPP presents the states with a suite of suggested energy 
resources, technologies, and regulatory innovations that will assist them in reducing carbon emissions 
from existing generating plants. The flexibility of the CPP is a necessary element because different states 
have different resource mixes and different electricity generation fleets. Consequently, states will craft 
either individual or multi-state plans to satisfy CPP requirements.  
Although the CPP is not yet final, individual states are already making progress toward satisfying CPP 
emission reduction targets. A recent report from Union of Concerned Scientists shows that all but four 
states have already decided to cut emissions; 14 states are already ahead of their emission rate trajectory; 
and 31 states will soon be at least halfway towards the 2020 benchmark. Perhaps most striking, one of the 
most politically vocal opponent states of the clean power plan, Kentucky, is ahead of meeting emissions 
reduction targets through already planned coal plant retirements.181 
The CPP’s carbon-reduction goal is compatible with the transition to a clean energy economy. 
Nevertheless, while the CPP allows for a variety of resources, including clean coal, nuclear power, and 
natural gas, together with renewable resources and energy 
efficiency, some resources are more compatible with a clean 
energy transition than others. It is, therefore, important to 
distinguish the costs and benefits associated with the various 
resources that can be used to satisfy the CPP. 
There is no settled or scientific definition for clean energy. 
Instead, it has been variously defined in a number of legal 
contexts. By way of example, renewable portfolio standards 
(RPSs) (or alternative energy portfolio standards) have been 
adopted by 41 states and the District of Columbia182 and 
cover more than 50 percent of total U.S. electricity demand. 
Each state program emphasizes different resources and sets 
different renewable percentage goals and timetables. Clean 
energy standards (CES), another form of an energy efficiency 
standard, as endorsed by the White House and introduced in 
Congress,183 operate similarly to RPS programs and can also 
promote renewable resources and reduce emissions. 
According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), a 
national CES would have the effects of reducing coal-fired 
generation; increasing the role of nuclear, natural gas, and renewable technologies; and, therefore, 
decreasing carbon dioxide emissions by 20 percent by 2025 and 44 percent by 2035,184 all of which would 
be consistent with the goals of the CPP.  
Energy efficiency standards (EES) are another tool promoting clean energy programs to reduce 
consumption by imposing efficiency standards on vehicles, appliances and buildings. Such programs 
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reduce consumption at a fraction of the cost of energy185 as emissions are reduced. In 2009, for example, 
the federal Energy Star program, which labels energy efficient appliances, prevented 45 million metric 
tons of greenhouse gas emissions, the equivalent of emissions from 30 million vehicles, and saved 
consumers $17 billion in their utility bills.186 And, Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards 
are now scheduled to achieve 54.5 miles per gallon for cars and light trucks by model year 2025,187 
dramatically increasing fuel efficiency. 
In addition to renewable energy and energy efficiency, the CPP also allows states to pursue “cleaner 
energy” resources by using clean coal, nuclear power, and most particularly, shale gas to reduce carbon 
emissions. While such flexibility is necessary as well as desirable, the CPP may, in fact, undervalue 
renewable resources188 and energy efficiency189 and may also under- estimate the social and economic 
costs of clean coal, nuclear power, and shale gas.190 
The	Social	and	Economic	Costs	of	Clean	Coal,	Nuclear	Power	and	Shale	Gas		
 
Clean Coal 
 
Clean coal, or carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), is attractive because carbon can be extracted from 
the coal burning process and the captured carbon may be put to beneficial uses.191 Although EPA did not 
include CCS as part of the best system for emission reduction (BSER) for determining state targets, states 
remain free to choose their own strategies for satisfying emission reduction targets, including CCS.192 
Clean coal, however, comes with significant challenges, most notably cost and environmental liability.193 
While the federal government has actively promoted CCS, it has not experienced great success. For 
example, of the eight demonstration projects initiated in 2003, only three were completed. Of the two 
projects initiated in 2004 only one was completed. Further, of the six projects selected by DOE in 2009-
2010, only three are still active, and that is due to an infusion of funds from the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009. Despite over $6 billion of federal funding, only two industrial projects are in 
operation, only one commercial scale project is in advanced construction, and only five projects are under 
development.194 The CCS industry then suffered a substantial blow in February 2015 when the DOE 
terminated funding of an Illinois project after determining that the project could not be completed even 
with the $1 billion allocated.  
Further, the cost of a CCS power plant can be more than double that of a conventional plant. And, there is 
a cost premium for operating a plant because CCS processes can consume between 15 and 30 percent of 
the power generated by a plant, thus constituting a costly “energy penalty.”195 As a result of these 
additional costs, it is estimated that electricity from CCS power plants can be expected to cost 75 percent 
more than electricity from conventional plants.196  
CCS projects also require transportation and storage infrastructure that expose air, land, and water to 
environmental risks as a result of methane leakage as well as toxic chemical spills from pipelines and 
storage facilities.197 Further, CCS projects require up to 3200 percent more water than non-CCS plants.198 
Finally, in the long-term, stored carbon could seep out if storage facilities prove more porous than 
expected.  
Nuclear Power  
Nuclear power is another available resource for satisfying CPP requirements because of its near zero 
carbon emissions.199 Although the BSER calculations for states did not include the construction of new 
nuclear power plants, it did assume the completion of plants currently under construction as well as 
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retention of the active nuclear fleet and avoiding premature nuclear plant closures. However, nuclear 
power may not be the best clean energy option for two significant reasons. First, nuclear power cannot 
pass a market test. Second, it is not necessary because greater gains in energy efficiency and in reduced 
carbon emissions can be realized by investing in alternative and renewable resources. 
Currently, five nuclear plants are under construction: two in Georgia, two in South Carolina, and one in 
Tennessee. These plants receive substantial federal subsidies and have been encountering rising costs as 
well as delays.200 Nuclear power is not cost competitive with coal, natural gas, or even alternative 
renewable resources. A major study by MIT showed that the levelized cost of electricity from nuclear 
power can become cost competitive only under very restrictive conditions such as the imposition of a 
carbon price and finding a solution for permanent waste disposal.201 Under those tight circumstances, 
then, nuclear generated electricity can become cost competitive. To date, however, none of those 
circumstances have been realized.  
Nuclear advocates also point to the promise of advanced nuclear reactor designs as well as the use of 
modular nuclear units.202 These technologies may be promising; however, they are not at commercial 
scale and present challenges including safety risks and economic costs. 
The issue for nuclear power, then, becomes not just the question of environmental risks; rather, the issue 
is whether there are other clean energy investments that would be more effective both in terms of 
generating electricity as well as reducing emissions. One study, for example, concludes that “[f]or every 
dollar you spend on nuclear, you could have saved five or six times as much carbon with efficiency or 
wind farms.”203  
Shale Gas204 
In recent years, industry and policymakers have paid increased attention to natural gas, and that attention 
has two distinct aspects. First, by assuming that states can increase their use of existing natural gas 
generating capacity, the CPP recognizes that natural gas will play a role in our energy future. Although 
not part of the BSER calculation, some states may meet their targets by not only shifting coal-fired 
generation to existing natural gas plants, but by building new natural gas plants. Increased reliance on 
natural gas can significantly reduce GHG emissions and help states meet their targets because natural gas 
plants emit about half of the carbon emitted by coal-fired plants. Second, the fossil fuel industry has 
experienced a resurgence in development lately and, therefore, remains a significant part of our energy 
economy. Relative to the CPP, then, care must be taken to adequately assess the contribution that natural 
gas can make to achieving its goals. 
Since 2005, domestic oil and gas production has been increasing dramatically. The International Energy 
Agency (IEA) reported that new discoveries in the United States are having a profound impact on 
domestic and global energy policies and markets.205 The IEA projects that by 2017 the United States will 
produce more oil than Saudi Arabia. Domestically, the EIA reports that shale gas has a positive impact on 
our energy economy,206 and a variety of other commentators claim that shale gas can address our major 
energy problems,207 serve as “game changer” for our domestic energy profile,208 and be a bridge fuel to 
the future.209 Indeed, in his 2012 State of the Union address, President Obama stated that the natural gas 
industry could create 600,000 jobs by the end of the decade.210  
Shale gas has much to recommend it: (1) abundant reserves yield low prices211 (2) natural gas power 
plants emit about half of the carbon dioxide released by coal; (3) natural gas is already displacing coal for 
electricity generation;212 (4) domestic production adds jobs; (5) we are beginning to reduce imports and 
increase energy exports;213 (6) the country is becoming more energy independent;214 and (7) given its 
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abundance, the price volatility experienced by the natural gas sector for the last two decades has been 
reduced.215   
Nevertheless, natural gas, particularly through horizontal fracturing, which is used in approximately two-
thirds of the natural gas wells in the United States and up to 95 percent of all new oil and gas wells 
currently being drilled,216 poses significant environmental costs and risks.217 
Air Pollution 
 
According to a study by the Union of Concerned Scientists, increased use of natural gas for electricity 
generation “could contribute to that sector’s overall increase in carbon dioxide emissions.”218 Shale gas 
production can cause air pollution from diesel engines, rigs, trucks, and other equipment. Additionally, 
gases are released from operating the wells, especially through venting and flaring, which releases large 
amounts of methane, fine particulate matter and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) that present risks to 
air and human health.219 Further, methane leakage has the potential to cause significant environmental 
harm. Although the amount of methane emissions is much lower than the emissions of carbon dioxide, 
methane is 72 times more potent at the time of release and 25 times more potent than carbon dioxide over 
a 100-year period.220  
While EPA initially concluded that the net environmental impact of methane emissions is likely to be 
small,221 other studies show that non-CO2 emissions from shale gas can result in lifecycle emissions 
higher than those of coal. As part of its Climate Action Plan, the White House has issued a white paper 
warning of the dangers of methane leakage, noting that methane emissions are expected to increase 
through 2030. EPA has been directed to issue methane rules to reduce emissions from oil and gas 
production 45 percent by 2025 from 2012 levels.222 The final regulations are expected by 2016. Thus, air 
pollution will be a continuing concern. 
Water Pollution 
 
Water is a necessary input into hydraulic fracturing processes and several environmental issues emerge. 
First, large volumes of water are withdrawn from both ground and surface waters thus reducing the 
available amount of water for human consumption. Second, various chemicals are mixed into the water to 
improve operations. Anywhere from 10 to 50 percent of the water injected into a well can “flow back.” 
The flowback water contains chemicals223 that are often toxic, including organic pollutants, heavy metals, 
and radioactive materials.224 Third, this wastewater must be transported and stored; spillage from either 
can also have health effects. Fourth, the change in water temperature use can introduce invasive species; 
increase pollutant concentrations; and negatively affect plants and wildlife. 225 In response, EPA has 
initiated a rulemaking to set water discharge standards for wastewater from shale gas production.226  
And, finally, wastewater treated and disposed of through underground injection could impact drinking 
water resources.227 EPA is prohibited from regulating injections from hydraulic fracturing operations 
under the Safe Drinking Water Act228 through a loophole known as the Halliburton exception, named for 
firm that lobbied for it and patented hydraulic fracturing in the 1940s.229 In 2010, EPA was directed by 
Congress to study and review the effects of hydraulic fracturing on drinking water resources. In 
December 2012, the agency issued a progress report on its study.230 EPA issued a draft report in June 
2015 which “did not find evidence that these mechanisms have led to widespread, systemic impacts on 
drinking water resources in the United States.”231 A final report is due in 2016.232   
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Community Disruption 
 
Shale gas development is occurring in regions, particularly in the eastern United States, that are 
unfamiliar with oil and gas exploration and production. Developing sites requires the use of trucks and 
other heavy equipment as well as the possible construction of new roads, drill pads, and gathering lines. 
These activities affect the immediate area and carry the risk of air emissions, odors, noise, spills, changes 
in land use, and the disruption of wildlife. They also impose widespread changes in the life in these 
communities. Concern about such disruption has led citizens to attempt to ban fracking in their 
communities.233 And, concern in New York about respiratory health, safety, drinking water, soil 
contamination, and seismic activity, as well as climate change, has led that state to ban fracturing.234 Such 
activity, unsurprisingly, has resulted in pushback legislation by the industry.235 
The shale gas boom has seen a significant increase in drilling activity. More wells are being drilled and 
with that increase there is a greater need for more surface usage. Operators need more access roads; 
habitats are disturbed; transportation activity increases dramatically; soil erosion occurs; and, water 
quality is adversely affected by stormwater runoff. In addition to growing conflicts between local, state, 
and federal authorities, conflicts about the use of and disruption to public lands are also increasing.236 
Recommendation:		
 While the CPP gives states the flexibility to adopt a wide variety of “cleaner energy” resources 
such as nuclear power, clean coal and, most notably, natural gas, states should draft state 
implementation plans that prioritize renewables and energy efficiency. A clean energy economy 
can contribute to economic growth, jobs, new technologies, greater competition among energy 
actors, and increased consumer choice.  
The	Clean	Power	Plan:	Issues	to	Watch	 	 	 Page	|	46		
Regional	Approaches	to	State	Power	Plan	Compliance	
By Alexandra B. Klass 
This section considers the potential for collaboration between states to achieve Clean Power Plan (CPP) 
Compliance. The proposed draft of the CPP is written so that it imposes an individual target for each 
state, and gives guidance for states to use the four “building blocks” flexibly to comply with that target. 
But the CPP also allows for interstate/regional cooperation to achieve compliance. Such regional 
approaches have significant potential to ease compliance burdens because they allow states, using trading 
mechanisms, to take advantage of low-cost emissions reductions or increased renewable energy 
generation in nearby states that may be able to take those actions in a more cost-effective manner. Experts 
estimate that compliance costs may be reduced by billions of dollars for states and utilities that take 
advantage of regional efficiencies and opportunities. Another significant benefit to regional compliance is 
that such approaches more accurately match the regional nature of the electric transmission grid and 
electricity markets, thus allowing market participants to use existing frameworks for compliance. After a 
discussion of the U.S. transmission grid and existing energy markets, this section presents some of the 
benefits and hurdles associated with regional approaches to CPP compliance.  
Background	on	the	Electricity	Grid	and	Electricity	Markets	and	Relevant	Clean	
Power	Plan	Provisions	on	Regional	Collaboration	
As an initial matter, the U.S. transmission grid is divided into three distinct interconnections: the Eastern 
Interconnection, which extends from the Atlantic Ocean to as far west as the western borders of the 
Dakotas and Nebraska, and south to Texas; the Western Interconnection which extends from the border of 
the Eastern Interconnection to 
the Pacific Ocean; and a smaller 
interconnection that includes 
most of Texas.237 There is little 
or no exchange of electricity 
between the interconnections. 
Within these three 
interconnections, or grids, 
Independent System Operators 
(ISOs) and Regional 
Transmission Organizations 
(RTOs), which are non-
governmental entities approved 
by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission 
(FERC), manage portions of the 
transmission grid and regional 
markets for wholesale power for 
much of the country.  
In general, utilities maintain ownership of the physical transmission lines, but the RTO or ISO handles the 
day-to-day operation of the system and sets prices for the wholesale electricity markets within its borders. 
Many RTOs also handle the Renewable Energy Credit (REC) markets that utilities use to show 
compliance with state renewable portfolio standards (RPS). (Notably, it is these state RPS that EPA relied 
on in part to determine the ability of each state to achieve compliance through increased generation of 
renewable energy as a replacement for energy resources that emit carbon dioxide (CO2) (building block 
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Experts estimate that compliance 
costs may be reduced by billions of 
dollars for states and utilities that 
take advantage of regional 
efficiencies and opportunities. 
3)).238 Membership in RTOs is voluntary and utilities may join RTOs, move to a new RTO, or choose not 
to participate in an RTO at all. RTOs cover approximately two-thirds of the U.S. population and meet 
approximately the same amount of U.S. electricity demand.  
EPA has set an initial emissions rate-based standard for each state, but states have the flexibility to 
convert that rate-based standard into a mass-based target.239 Thus, each state may choose to comply with 
the CPP based on a rate-based target (pounds of carbon dioxide per megawatt hour (lbs CO2/MWh)) or a 
mass-based target (tons CO2/state/year). States may choose 
to collaborate by entering into multi-state partnerships to 
achieve a blended rate-based or mass-based target. This 
would allow states with a high cost of generating more 
natural gas or renewable energy to engage in credit trading 
with states that can generate lower-carbon or no-carbon 
energy at lower cost. This is similar to how the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the Northeast 
currently operates and is also similar to the trading of RECs 
in multi-state RTO markets. If a state chooses to comply on 
a stand-alone basis, the state must submit its compliance plan by June 1, 2016. If two or more states 
inform EPA that they intend to engage in regional compliance, the compliance deadline is extended to 
June 1, 2017 to allow for the necessary coordination among the states.240  
Potential	Approaches	for	Regional	Compliance	
Regional approaches can range from formal interstate collaborations with a shared target, like RGGI to 
RTO-based frameworks that create a trading platform that would allow utilities to trade emissions 
allowances within and across state lines and that would effectively set a price on carbon241 to state-
specific plans that include common plan elements with neighboring states, such as a common accounting 
system242 to memoranda of understanding (MOUs) on a range of common issues for states.243  
The most “collaborative” of the various regional approaches would be variations on formal greenhouse 
gas (GHG) reduction alliances like RGGI. For those states that are already members of RGGI,244 revisions 
to the existing program to bring it in line with the requirements of the CPP would allow each member 
state to take advantage of regional efficiencies and trading to meet a joint, mass-based cap on CO2 
emissions. While such an approach may work well for the RGGI states, it is much less feasible in other 
states that are either opposed to the CPP on political grounds or do not wish to enter into formal 
agreements with other states on compliance.  
For instance, even in Virginia, where Gov. Terry McAuliffe and the state Department of Environmental 
Quality (DEQ) have proposed joining RGGI to meet the requirements of the CPP, state legislators have 
rebuffed any efforts for legislative authority to do so.245 This is true even though state regulators estimate 
that the state will be unable to bring utility-scale wind or solar power on line by the 2020 deadline for 20 
percent CO2 emissions reductions, and even though experts indicate that if the state joined RGGI it would 
earn more than $2.8 billion over the next 15 years, partly through auctions selling GHG allowances.  
Moreover, even where states join a formal alliance, such alliances may be unstable if politics within the 
region change dramatically. For example, states can leave RGGI or similar organizations, as was the case 
when Gov. Chris Christie withdrew the state of New Jersey from RGGI in 2011. Because alliances like 
RGGI are so new and in many ways legally untested, there have also been legal challenges to the ability 
of a governor to unilaterally commit his or her state to RGGI (New York)246 as well as to unilaterally 
withdraw from RGGI (New Jersey).247  
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Even for those states that may not oppose the CPP on political grounds, the interstate agreements 
necessary to adopt a single, multi-state, mass-based or rate-based target would require a level of 
coordination between states on energy policy that to date does not exist outside RGGI and, arguably, even 
within RGGI. Each state that is party to the agreement would need to agree on whether to use a rate-based 
or a mass-based target and the appropriate conversion mechanism. The environmental agencies within 
each state would also have to coordinate on significant rulemaking to develop compatible compliance 
plans and dispute resolution procedures on a whole host of issues.248 Moreover, states with less stringent 
individual targets might need to meet a more stringent blended target under either a rate-based or mass-
based approach, which would be an additional disincentive for states with low EPA-imposed targets to 
collaborate.249 
But there are opportunities for regional compliance outside formal arrangements like RGGI in the form of 
new, interstate trading platforms that states and RTOs around the country are discussing.250 All of these 
options other than formal, interstate collaborations like RGGI allow states to set individual targets and 
then use a range of interstate trading options, some of which are discussed below, to meet that target. 
For instance, there would appear to be significant, cost-effective trading opportunities for states within 
RTOs like the Mid-Continent Independent System Operator (MISO) and PJM that cover large areas of the 
United States with significant population centers, extensive transmission line networks, a history of 
cooperation, and the potential for generating significant new sources of utility-scale wind and/or solar 
energy. MISO estimates that “a regional approach to carbon management could save Market Participants 
$3 billion to $5 billion annually.”251 Likewise, the PJM RTO analyzed various scenarios covering 
different combinations and levels of renewable resources, energy efficiency, natural gas prices, nuclear 
generation, and new entry of natural gas combined-cycle resources. It also compared regional compliance 
versus state-by-state compliance for each scenario. Ultimately, PJM concluded that state-by-state 
compliance options would result in higher compliance costs than regional compliance options for most 
PJM states. This is because there are more low-cost options available within the entire PJM region than 
there are within each individual state’s boundaries.252 
One option MISO and the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) RTOs are considering is a framework where the 
states would submit to EPA individual implementation plans using their own mass-based targets.253 Once 
EPA approves the plans, the states would use trading within the RTO to reduce the costs of meeting their 
goals. According to one consultant, this would create regional coordination that doesn’t require a “grand 
bargain” of all the states trying to reallocate emissions using a rate-based approach or require states to 
reach the level of agreement on a group target and each state’s respective responsibility to meet that target 
like in RGGI.254 In other words, “[i]f it makes sense for [Iowa] to over-comply to reduce their tons even 
further so that they can sell them to Minnesota, which is cheaper for Minnesota than doing the next most 
onerous thing … that’s how it’s going to work. It’s self-interest for both states.”255 According to one 
MISO representative, putting a regional price on carbon and working with MISO to trade within the 
region would be similar to what is already in place for SO2 trading under the acid rain provisions of the 
Clean Air Act, and would be a cost-effective compliance option for the region.256 
There are other opportunities for states outside of RTOs and ISOs to collaborate to meet individual 
targets, such as entering into memoranda of understanding or developing “common elements” plans. In 
this situation, states would set individual targets but include in their plans provisions that would allow 
affected sources to use common, tradable compliance instruments such as emissions allowances, and 
create compatible tracking systems for credits and allowances.257 
Limitations	on	Regional	Compliance	and	Ways	to	Overcome	Them	
Currently, the CPP only allows renewable generation and other lower-emission generation to “count” in 
the state where it is generated, not the state where it is imported and used. But one of the benefits of 
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regional collaboration would be to increase renewable energy generation, lower-emission natural gas 
generation, and energy efficiency in parts of the region where it is most cost effective and then allow 
utilities to use RECs or other credit trading to meet a regional compliance cap or individual state caps. As 
a result, the CPP would seem to hinder regional approaches to compliance because of the difficulty of 
deciding which state gets “credit” for the reduced emissions.  
For example, in the context of using renewable energy to meet an individual state target, states may not be 
able to generate new renewable resources in a cost-effective manner but they may be able to acquire such 
generation from neighboring states where such renewable generation can be more cheaply developed or 
expanded. Indeed, in many regions, the RPS in one state 
drives renewable energy development in neighboring states 
as much as or more than in the RPS state. Minnesota is an 
example. Although Minnesota now uses a significant 
amount of wind energy in its electricity mix (over 15 
percent), much of that wind energy is imported from Iowa, 
North Dakota, and South Dakota, which have greater low-
cost wind generation potential. Minnesota imposes an 
aggressive RPS on its utilities — 25 percent of the 
electricity mix must be from renewable sources by 2025 and 
that requirement is 30 percent for Xcel Energy, which is the 
largest utility in the state. Iowa, North Dakota, and South 
Dakota do not have mandatory RPSs or have very low 
mandates that they exceeded years ago. But Minnesota’s 
RPS is driving renewable energy development in those 
neighboring states because utilities can meet the Minnesota 
RPS in a more cost-effective manner by developing (or 
contracting for) new wind energy resources in other states. 
In other words, Minnesota’s RPS drives renewable energy 
development for the region. The same is true for California, 
with an RPS of 30 percent that the state is likely to increase 
in the near future. Because California cannot generate 
enough renewable energy within the state to meet that target 
(or to meet it in the most cost-effective manner), its RPS is 
driving renewable energy development in the form of 
utility-scale wind and solar projects in Arizona, New Mexico, 
Oregon, and Washington, and even as far away as Wyoming, if 
the necessary transmission lines can be built. The CPP should encourage imports and exports of 
renewable energy to support these trends, not hinder them.  
The CPP should either create a tracking platform for states to use in such trades or allow states to 
establish their own tracking platform based on the ones that currently exist for trading RECs.258 Without 
such tracking systems, there is the potential for double counting reductions based on renewable energy 
generation, particularly if one state uses a rate-based approach and another uses a mass-based approach. 
Tracking systems for RECs exist throughout the nation, as shown in the map that follows, even in those 
regions that are not currently part of an RTO or an ISO. 
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Experts have highlighted the difficulty of allowing for trades of renewable energy resources for CPP 
compliance purposes between mass-based and rate-based states because the metrics are so different.259 As 
a result, if states want the option to use regional trading as part of their compliance plans, they should 
consider using mass-based targets rather than rate-based targets.260 This would avoid the difficulty of 
converting between rate-based and mass-based targets as part of a trading platform. It would also avoid 
the problem — that states that are allowed a higher statewide emissions rate would be penalized if the rate 
were blended into a lower regional standard. 
Another limitation on regional compliance is the lack of adequate interstate natural gas pipelines and 
interstate electricity transmission lines to facilitate the movement of new sources of low-carbon or no-
carbon electric energy resources. Most experts believe that a cost-effective means of CPP compliance in 
the Northeast region will be increased reliance on combined-cycle natural gas generation to replace higher 
CO2-emitting existing electricity resources. To increase the use of natural gas for electricity generation in 
the Northeast, more natural gas pipelines must be built to better transport natural gas to and within that 
region. In the absence of such pipelines the regional cost of natural gas in the Northeast may be too high 
for this to be a cost-effective compliance option.261 Likewise, there are more than 10 million MW of 
onshore wind resources, most of which are concentrated in the Midwest and Plains states, enough to 
power 10 times the nation’s electricity needs.262 But those carbon-free electricity resources are 
constrained by inadequate long-distance transmission lines that often take decades to plan and construct.  
The CPP will likely not address these infrastructure siting issues directly because ownership of 
infrastructure resources is mainly in the private sector and regulatory authority to approve them is 
fragmented among local, state, and federal authorities (in the case of electric transmission lines). 
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Nevertheless, EPA can provide guidance and funding to encourage states to cooperate to build the 
infrastructure needed to transport low-carbon and renewable energy resources across state lines. 
Conclusion	
Thus, in considering the CPP obligations, states should consider regional approaches to compliance. Such 
approaches can include a regional rate-based or mass-based cap, a “common elements” approach, or 
individual state caps with a trading platform within existing or newly defined RTO regions. With regard 
to all the regional approaches, it appears that a mass-based approach may best facilitate regional 
collaboration, particularly where states choose to adopt an individual cap and use emissions trading or 
collaboration with other states to meet it. 
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Section	IV:	Discrete	Implementation	Issues	
The previous two sections of this paper addressed challenges to the Clean Power Plan (CPP) and its broad 
implications for the future of the nation’s energy sector. This final section takes on a number of 
significant issues focused on specific elements of the CPP and its implementation. It addresses the use of 
cap-and-trade and offsets; explores issues raised by state targets, including how they compare across 
states and the merits of mass-based vs. rate-based targets; and concludes with an examination of the 
environmental justice implications of the CPP. 
  
The	Clean	Power	Plan:	Issues	to	Watch	 	 	 Page	|	53		
Allowing states to use cap‐and‐
trade programs to meet their CPP 
targets would also be less 
disruptive of existing state 
greenhouse gas cap‐and‐trade 
programs than imposing direct 
regulatory requirements that 
ignore existing state programs. For 
example, the northeastern states 
that are already participating in 
the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI), a GHG reduction 
cap‐and‐trade program for power 
plants, could comply with the CPP 
by continued participation in the 
program, although some 
adjustments would be required. 
Should	the	Clean	Power	Plan	Embrace	Cap‐and‐Trade	Programs	
for	Greenhouse	Gas	Reductions,	Including	Offsets?	
By Robert L. Glicksman, Victor Flatt, and Alice Kaswan  
EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan (CPP) rule is premised on EPA’s legal authority under § 111(d) of the 
Clean Air Act (CAA) to propose the best system of emission reduction (BSER) for states to reduce 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) at existing electric generating units (EGUs). In the proposed rulemaking, EPA 
allows states considerable flexibility in meeting reduction targets, and allows and encourages the states to 
continue to use their existing programs and adopt new cap-and-trade programs. States, on their own or in 
conjunction with other states, can convert their rate-based targets to mass-based targets and then use a 
cap-and-trade program to meet them, on its own or in 
combination with complementary regulatory measures. The 
“cap” in the cap-and-trade program can reflect EPA’s target 
for the state or states participating in the program. A utility 
receiving a limited number of allowances under the cap-and-
trade program can choose a variety of mechanisms to meet 
the cap, including retiring or reducing the use of coal-fired 
power, promoting energy efficiency, or investing in lower-
emission alternatives.  
The use of cap-and-trade under § 111(d) presents a wrinkle, 
however: In the proposed rule, EPA has stated that, in 
determining whether states have met their reduction targets, 
it will only count measures that lead to reductions at affected 
sources — power plants. It will not count reductions from 
other sources, like refineries or offsets generated by such 
activities as forest conservation, creating a disconnect with 
many states’ existing GHG cap-and-trade programs. This 
section first addresses the legal and policy issues associated 
with the use of cap-and-trade in general, and then addresses 
the legal and policy issues associated with allowing non-
EGU allowances or offsets to count in meeting a state’s 
target.  
Allowing	States	to	Use	Cap‐and‐Trade1  
In its proposed CPP rule, EPA observed that the flexibility afforded states by allowing them to 
incorporate cap-and-trade programs, including pre-existing state and multi-state programs, into their 
implementation plans would reduce the cost of achieving the state goals, making such an approach 
“attractive to states.”263 One of the longstanding criticisms of traditional regulatory approaches under 
statutes such as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act is that those approaches sacrifice potential 
efficiencies in pollution control by failing to differentiate between regulated facilities at which the cost of 
controlling emissions are high and those at which control costs are lower. All regulated facilities within a 
particular category of regulated sources tend to be treated alike. An economically efficient approach to 
pollution control would subject sources with high control costs to relatively lenient controls, while 
expecting higher reductions from those with low control costs. That approach would achieve the same 
                                                            
1 This section was written by Robert L. Glicksman. 
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level of reductions as a more uniform approach, but at a lower aggregate cost. Emissions trading 
programs can achieve this result because they allow high-cost emitters to buy allowances from low-cost 
emission reducers that have excess allowances because they have substantially reduced emissions.  
Allowing states to use cap-and-trade programs to meet their CPP targets would also be less disruptive of 
existing state GHG cap-and-trade programs than imposing direct regulatory requirements that ignore 
existing state programs. For example, the northeastern states that are already participating in the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a GHG reduction cap-and-trade program for power plants, could 
comply with their § 111(d) duties by continued participation in the program, although some adjustments 
would be required. Given EPA’s encouragement to states to seek out cost-effective ways to reduce GHG 
emissions, particularly in collaboration with one another, it would make little sense to require states with 
existing programs to start from scratch instead of being able to build on existing programs that have 
already demonstrated the capacity to reduce emissions efficiently and with which regulators and regulated 
entities are familiar. 
EPA’s allowance of cap-and-trade programs in the CPP reflects EPA’s longstanding support for market-
based mechanisms. Over the years, EPA, with the strong support of economists and legislators and 
agency officials from both sides of the political aisle, has increasingly relied on market-based 
mechanisms to assist in controlling air pollution. As discussed in David Driesen’s article on mass-based 
caps elsewhere in this paper, the bubble concept was a form of internal emissions trading. More 
importantly, the acid rain program adopted as part of the 1990 CAA amendments established the first 
large-scale emissions trading program in federal environmental legislation. Perhaps not coincidentally, 
the program applied to EGUs that emit sulfur dioxide (SO2) or oxides of nitrogen. Congress determined 
that a program that allows regulated entities a range of choices in meeting their emission reduction 
responsibilities, including trading emission allowances among sources, is the most efficient way to abate 
acid rain. By most accounts, the program worked even better (and at lower cost) than anticipated. EPA 
has subsequently incorporated into its CAA regulatory programs trading and other mechanisms that 
provide a flexible array of options permitting sources to take advantage of the efforts of others, or other 
parts of their own operations, to meet their compliance duties.  
These programs were not explicitly rooted in CAA provisions the way the acid rain program is. And yet, 
the programs have received judicial endorsement, most recently in the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in 
the EME Homer case, concerning interstate pollution.264 And part of the underpinning for that approval 
has been Chevron deference, as discussed further in Melissa Powers’ contribution on judicial deference 
principles. There is therefore precedent for EPA’s reliance on cross-source compliance mechanisms to 
achieve efficient pollution reduction, even without explicit statutory foundation. 
In addition, Congress is on board: In the 1990 amendments, it amended § 110, the provision governing 
state implementation plans (SIPs), to explicitly authorize inclusion in state plans of tradeable instruments 
and economic incentives.265 Because § 111(d) plans are cross-referenced to § 110 by analogy, there is 
reason to believe extension of § 111(d) plans beyond the parameters of a single EGU is fully consistent 
with the statute. The appeal of these approaches is further enhanced if EPA vests in the states broad 
discretion to pick and choose among more conventional, source-specific approaches and more novel and 
expansive cross-source mechanisms, as EPA has done in its CPP proposal. 
Some environmental justice advocates have expressed concern that cap-and-trade approaches could fail to 
achieve desirable co-pollutant benefits because they do not optimize the distribution of pollution 
reduction benefits. As discussed further in Alice Kaswan’s contribution on the Clean Power Plan and 
environmental justice, however, the proposed CPP’s approach to cap-and-trade could have fewer of the 
downsides and greater advantages than other existing GHG reduction programs.  
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Allowing the use of offsets and 
non‐EGU allowances could 
undercut the stringency of EPA’s 
program and, as a consequence, 
slow the hoped‐for transition to a 
cleaner energy system. The CPP 
targets have been set based upon 
EPA’s assessment of the “best 
system of emission reduction” for 
coal‐fired power plants, and EPA 
has determined what targets are 
achievable within the existing 
power system. If the use of offsets 
or a broader trading system 
allowed states and their utilities to 
invest in fewer of these measures, 
then electricity sector emissions 
could continue unabated, and 
achievable mechanisms to green 
our electricity generation would be 
left unexploited. 
Allowing	States	to	Use	Offsets	and	non‐EGU	Allowances	to	Meet	Their	Targets2  
While EPA’s proposed CPP would allow reductions from trading between fossil fuel-fired EGUs 
regulated under the CPP, the proposed rule indicates that states cannot count “offsets” from other GHG 
sources or trades with non-EGU GHG sources inside or outside of the United States.  
However, existing state GHG trading programs, including RGGI and California’s AB32, have a wider 
trading scope. Both programs allow a certain percentage of GHG source reductions to be met with 
biological and other approved offsets. And, while RGGI is limited to the power sector, California’s AB32 
covers most of the GHG sources in the economy, notably from transportation as well as from power 
plants, and allows trades between EGUs and non-EGUs as well as the use of offsets. California has also 
officially linked its trading system with Quebec, and will soon link with Ontario, which means that trades 
and reductions can come from non-U.S. reductions recognized as a greenhouse gas credit in those 
systems.  
If EPA were to allow non-EGU or non-U.S. trades and the use of offsets in a state’s BSER system, it 
would have both pros and cons from a policy perspective.  
Policy Arguments in Favor of Allowing the Use of Non‐EGU Trading, Non‐U.S. Trading, and 
Offsets  
At the outset, it’s worth noting that broad trading is especially well-suited for GHGs because the location 
and source of the reductions does not matter. Greenhouse gases become well mixed in the atmosphere 
upon release and their greenhouse gas potential is relative to 
worldwide concentrations, and so GHG reduction of any 
kind in any location is as good as a greenhouse gas 
reduction at another location. From the standpoint of 
achieving GHG reduction targets, it does not matter what 
source or location generates the reduction.  
More specifically, four reasons support allowing the states 
to use offsets and all GHG reductions in meeting the state 
target: Such a system 1) is more economically efficient, 2) 
makes it easier for EPA to expand covered entities under 
§ 111(d) (such as refineries) in future rulemakings, 3) 
makes it easier to integrate state GHG cap-and-trade 
programs with offsets into a worldwide GHG emissions 
trading system, and 4) makes it easier for states with 
existing GHG trading programs to comply with the CPP.  
First, an “all GHG reductions” strategy is by definition 
more economically efficient as GHG emitters could seek 
out the cheapest reductions, many of which may exist 
outside the electricity sector. For example, forest 
conservation that sequesters carbon could be cheaper than 
investing in renewable energy. Or efficiency improvements 
in other industries, like cement manufacturing, could be 
more cost-effective than efficiency upgrades at existing 
                                                            
2 This section was written by Victor Flatt. 
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power plants. Second, if and when EPA issues § 111(d) emission guidelines for other industries, like 
refineries and cement-manufacturing, these industries would already be integrated into GHG reduction 
programs, facilitating these future regulatory efforts. Third, trading systems with offsets dominate GHG 
control strategies around the globe, and the use of such systems is increasing rapidly. We hope that, in the 
long run, the United States and its states will coordinate their GHG reduction efforts with other 
international efforts. The more that the characteristics of U.S. trading programs match other international 
programs, the easier it will be to ultimately integrate state programs into a worldwide system. 
Fourth, and most importantly, EPA’s current approach will complicate compliance for states that have 
already taken the initiative to adopt mandatory GHG cap-and-trade programs because it will require them 
to develop new controls and tracking mechanisms to ensure that sufficient reductions are coming from the 
power sector itself. If EPA instead allowed an “all GHG reductions” strategy, states with current GHG 
cap-and-trade programs could continue using their existing systems without having to make complex 
adjustments. The proposed rule purported to encourage the states to use whatever means they choose to 
meet the targets established by the four building blocks. EPA should extend its promised flexibility to the 
use of non-EGU allowances and offsets.  
Policy Arguments Against Allowing the Use of Offsets3  
On the other hand, allowing the use of offsets and non-EGU allowances could undercut the stringency of 
EPA’s program and, as a consequence, slow the hoped-for transition to a cleaner energy system. The CPP 
targets have been set based upon EPA’s assessment of the “best system of emission reduction” for coal-
fired power plants, and EPA has determined what targets are achievable within the existing power system. 
If the use of offsets or a broader trading system allowed states and their utilities to invest in fewer of these 
measures, then electricity sector emissions could continue unabated, and achievable mechanisms to green 
our electricity generation would be left unexploited. While offsets and broader trading systems might 
provide cheaper reduction options, the 2030 target provides states and utilities with the opportunity to 
invest in long-term measures that set us on a needed transition away from reliance on fossil fuels. This 
result could be avoided if the use of offsets and non-EGU allowances were included in the BSER calculus 
for setting state targets, leading to much more stringent targets, but that result is highly unlikely given the 
statutory focus on sector-specific regulation. 
Moreover, as discussed in more detail in the section on the CPP’s environmental justice implications, 
allowing states to count offsets in meeting their targets would reduce the co-pollutant benefits associated 
with actual reductions from existing EGUs in the United States.266 If any GHG reduction or sequestration 
would count, and utilities purchase offsets to keep running their coal-fired power plants rather than 
investing in consumer energy efficiency or lower-emitting sources, EGUs would continue to emit GHGs 
and associated co-pollutants. 
It is true that the inconsistencies between what counts for compliance with EPA’s target and what counts 
for compliance within existing (or future) state cap-and-trade programs will create administrative and 
logistical challenges as utilities consider the extent to which they can cover their emissions with offsets or 
non-EGU allowances. However, that challenge appears surmountable; for example, states could track 
electricity sector allowances separately, while still participating in a broader trading program with offsets. 
For better or for worse, utilities must often juggle complex webs of differing regulatory requirements, and 
the benefits of achieving real change in the electricity sector outweigh the administrative challenges.  
                                                            
3 This section was written by Alice Kaswan 
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   Legal Arguments Supporting the Use of Offsets and Non‐EGU Allowances4  
Whether one assumes that allowing non-EGU, non-U.S. trading including offsets is a net good or bad or 
can be improved, there have been questions about whether it is statutorily consistent with § 111(d). 
Certain legal interpretations support such a reading. 
As noted in the section on EPA’s “beyond the fenceline” approach, § 111(d) standards are performance 
standards, meaning that what matters is that utilities in the aggregate reduce their GHG emissions 
sufficiently to hit EPA’s targeted levels. The legality of this approach depends on the meaning of the 
word “system,” which neither EPA nor the courts have interpreted before. As detailed in the prior 
discussion of EPA’s systemwide approach, the term “system” can be interpreted broadly, a result that is 
consistent with past practice and congressional intent. EPA has relied on this interpretation in proposing 
that states can use GHG reductions from efficiency gains, trading with other EGUs, and substitution of 
low- or no-emission fuel sources to meet their targets.  
However, EPA has imposed limits on a state’s ability to use other GHG reductions or offsets. EPA 
appears to interpret the reference to “reductions from affected units,” in § 111(d) as limiting the use of 
GHG offsets and related mechanisms. Thus, the draft CPP rule proposes to allow “outside the fenceline” 
reductions that arguably lead to reductions at an affected unit, but to preclude ones that lead to reductions 
outside of a unit. This distinction, however, is not necessarily required by the statute. The statute itself 
does not refer to reductions from affected units, but instead, the best system of emission reductions. While 
§ 111(b) refers to “categories” of stationary sources and “standards of performance... within such 
category,” § 111(d) simply requires “standards of performance (for an) existing source.” There is no 
equivalent language to “within.” This suggests that the reduction need not come from the specific source 
(or even like sources) itself.  
The proposed rule allows any affected unit to receive credit for reductions that it has purchased in another 
state from another affected unit, as well as crediting reductions that come from altering the electricity-
producing fleet itself to contain more zero- or lower-GHG emission sources. EPA asserts that these 
reductions would come from “affected units,” but that result requires defining the affected units as 
anything from which electricity can be produced. This means that § 111(d) is not the same source control 
regulation as exists in § 111(b).  
If “affected unit” were the distinctive dividing line between what reductions can or cannot be counted in 
the BSER, an argument could be made that only fossil fuel-fired units could be considered EGUs for 
purposes of the rule. Other sources, such as nuclear, wind, and solar, do not produce GHGs at all, placing 
them outside the definition of an “affected unit” subject to regulation. While dispatch of other energy 
sources could be seen as causing emissions reductions at fossil fueled EGUs, this is not always the case. 
Increases in non-GHG electricity might mean that some fossil fueled EGUs would produce less, but not 
necessarily at any one unit (the affected unit). EGU trading might similarly create a reduction somewhere, 
but again not at a particular “affected unit.” Thus, the differences between this and reductions at other 
sources, such as offsets, or non-EGU GHG producers are minimal, since the “affected unit” itself might 
see no reduction.  
We agree with EPA that reductions are not limited to fossil fuel-fired EGUs, not because affected units 
include non-GHG-producing electricity sources, but because the “affected units” language is not 
dispositive in the statute.  
                                                            
4 This section was written by Victor Flatt. 
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Section 111(d) could be interpreted to support reductions from any verifiable source in a “system of 
emission reduction.” There is nothing magical about reductions from non-fossil fueled EGUs that make 
them the only reductions that qualify as “outside the fenceline” reductions. And assuming that “outside 
the fenceline” reductions are allowed if the states so choose, which we believe is the crux of the reference 
to § 110, then they can be allowed outside of electricity producing units.  
Section 111(d)’s reference to § 110, which elaborates state implementation planning to comply with 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), also supports a broad interpretation of acceptable 
compliance mechanisms. In describing the state’s SIP process for meeting federal targets under § 111(d), 
the statute states that the procedure governing approval of state systems of emission reduction for existing 
sources should be “similar to that provided by § 110.” The hallmark of a § 110 SIP is that states are 
allowed substantial flexibility in meeting the ambient standards. In Union Electric Co. v. EPA,267 the 
Supreme Court upheld EPA’s position that if a proposed SIP would be effective in meeting the ambient 
air quality standards, EPA must approve that SIP. This result is consistent with the cooperative federalism 
structure that is at the heart of the Clean Air Act (CAA). While EPA has not had cause to consider the 
direct meaning of § 111(d)’s reference to § 110 before, it could be interpreted to mean that § 111(d) 
provides a hybrid sort of emissions reduction approach that includes not only source-specific controls, but 
a wider array as well. As discussed in the section on EPA’s use of a systemwide approach that extends 
beyond the fenceline, it could be interpreted to give states the substantial flexibility and autonomy in 
selecting the means of achieving such reductions that is contemplated by § 110 for meeting the NAAQS 
limits. Unless EPA is willing to grant the same sort of flexibility to the states under this section that it 
does under § 110, it reads the reference to § 110 out of the statute, which was not the intent of the 
drafters.  
It makes sense to model § 111(d) SIPs on the § 110 process because § 111(d) was designed to fill a 
regulatory gap for pollutants that did not fall under the § 110 process because they were not criteria 
pollutants. The regulation of existing units under § 111(d) is unusual because it is limited to those 
pollutants that have not already been regulated as criteria pollutants under § 109 and § 110, or as 
hazardous air pollutants under § 112. Although the original 1970 Act required EPA to set standards for 
new sources of criteria air pollutants, it gave the states full authority to determine criteria pollutant 
controls on existing sources, and though somewhat qualified under more recent amendments, 
considerable state autonomy in controlling criteria pollutant emissions from existing sources remains. The 
states, in crafting their SIPs, can regulate those sources in multiple ways: e.g., close them down, operate 
them for fewer hours, or allow existing sources to expand with offsets. Section 111(d) fills the void for 
regulating existing sources that would not be reined in by the NAAQS and implementation of the 
NAAQS by the states. Thus, the similar procedure for state regulation of existing sources for the NAAQS 
(§ 110) is a critical component of § 111(d)’s regulation of existing sources that are not criteria pollutants.  
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States … are offered the 
opportunity to submit plans to EPA 
that meet the federal standard, 
and, if approved by the agency, the 
state plans are subsequently 
enforceable as a matter of both 
state and federal law by the states 
and EPA, respectively. By 
submitting a state plan, states are 
able to exercise a degree of control 
over how the federal standard will 
be implemented within their 
state…. If a state declines to submit 
a state plan, EPA must promulgate 
a plan for the state and implement 
and enforce the plan within the 
state. Thus, under the federal‐state 
partnership envisioned by the 
cooperative federalism regime, EPA 
is the dominant “partner” charged 
with the responsibility to establish 
federal standards and see them 
into effect across the nation.  
EPA’s	Treatment	of	States	
By Kirsten H. Engel 
A key issue threaded throughout the Clean Power Plan (CPP) is how EPA treats the states. To what extent 
does EPA ratify states’ control over their own electricity sectors, and to what extent does EPA step in and 
assert authority? To the extent states differ significantly in terms of their existing reliance upon fossil 
fuels for electricity, to what extent does EPA allow these discrepancies to continue, and to what extent 
does EPA seek to eliminate these differences by compelling states whose existing electricity sectors are 
comparatively more carbon-intensive to reduce their carbon intensity to match states whose existing 
electricity sectors are more “green”? 
After some important background, this section will discuss each of these issues in turn. 
Background	
Clean Air Act Section 111(d)’s Cooperative Federalism Structure 
Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) imposes a relationship between EPA and the states known as 
“cooperative federalism.” Under this framework, EPA establishes federal standards — in this case, “best 
technology” guidelines for existing fossil fuel electric 
generators. States, in turn, are offered the opportunity to 
submit plans to EPA that meet the federal standard, and, if 
approved by the agency, the state plans are subsequently 
enforceable as a matter of both state and federal law by the 
states and EPA, respectively. By submitting a state plan, 
states are able to exercise a degree of control over how the 
federal standard will be implemented within their state, and 
states are generally accorded a degree of deference in terms 
of enforcement, though EPA may file an enforcement action 
if it is convinced the state enforcement efforts are not 
sufficiently aggressive.  
If a state declines to submit a state plan, EPA must 
promulgate a plan for the state and implement and enforce 
the plan within the state. Thus, under the federal-state 
partnership envisioned by the cooperative federalism regime, 
EPA is the dominant “partner” charged with the 
responsibility to establish federal standards and see them into 
effect across the nation. The agency is allowed to delegate 
implementation and enforcement of the standards to the 
states but, at the end of the day, the responsibility for the 
effectiveness of the standards is EPA’s. Thus if a state is not 
willing to take on the job of implementation, it falls to EPA 
to do so. For more detail on the consequences of a state 
choosing not to submit an implementation plan, see Thomas 
McGarity’s article on “recalcitrant states” elsewhere in this 
paper.  
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EPA’s methodology results in the 
establishment of state emissions 
goals that are essentially 
incremental improvements upon 
the electricity generating 
development path that the state 
has chosen. Generally, EPA has not 
based its standards for individual 
states on an assumption of radical 
changes of their existing policies. 
Most of the federal environmental laws enacted during the 1970s employ this cooperative federalism 
approach.268 Most importantly, this is the structure of § 110 of the CAA, the provision on which Congress 
explicitly modeled § 111(d). As in § 111(d), Congress directed EPA to establish federal standards and 
allowed for states and tribal governments to write state or tribal implementation plans (SIPs or TIPs) to 
implement the federal standards. In states, or for tribes that 
failed to do so, EPA is required to write and implement a 
federal implementation plan (FIP).  
Several important differences exist between the two 
provisions, however, each of which has significance for 
EPA’s FIP authority. First, the federal standard implemented 
under § 110 is a maximum allowable ambient air quality 
standard for various pollutants, known as “criteria” 
pollutants. In contrast, the federal standard called for under 
§ 111(d) is an emissions performance standard for a 
particular source category — fossil fuel-fired electric 
generators. Under the law, EPA standards are to be 
established based upon the “best system of emissions 
reduction” (BSER). Second, ambient standards that states 
implement under § 110 are to be established by EPA according 
to what is necessary to avoid unacceptable threats to human health and the environment, irrespective of 
the costs of compliance with such standards. In contrast, Congress directed EPA to establish BSER upon 
a consideration of cost, technical feasibility, and other factors. 
History of state measures reducing reliance on fossil fuels in their respective electricity sectors 
In its proposed rule, EPA extensively documents the strides undertaken by states since at least the 1990s 
to reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs) from their electricity sectors.269 270 
Does	the	Clean	Power	Plan	Take	into	Account	Differences	Between	State	
Energy	Generating	Capacities	and	Resources?	
Under the proposed rule, the answer to the question is a categorical “yes.” Although EPA establishes a 
uniform methodology for determining each state’s emissions rate goal, the actual goal is established 
through the input of state-specific information into EPA’s BSER-calculation methodology. This 
methodology aggregates information about each state’s electric generating facilities and current mix of 
generation resources (e.g., renewable resources) as reflected in the four BSER building blocks. The 
addition of the emissions rates generated for the state by each building block constitutes each state’s 
emissions rate goal that the state must achieve by 2030.  
Thus, EPA’s methodology results in the establishment of state emissions goals that are essentially 
incremental improvements upon the electricity generating development path that the state has chosen. 
Generally, EPA has not based its standards for individual states on an assumption of radical changes of 
their existing policies. Take, for example, states such as Kentucky and West Virginia that rely primarily 
on coal for the generation of electricity — Kentucky is 92-percent reliant on coal and West Virginia is 96-
percent reliant — and have not made large investments in renewable or nuclear energy, perhaps because 
they do not possess easily exploited renewable resources in-state or nuclear power and have not enacted 
energy conservation policies.271 The emissions rate for these states will be largely the product of Building 
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Block 1, which consists of carbon dioxide reductions achievable through efficiency improvements and 
other measures capable of being implemented at individual fossil fuel generating facilities. 
On the other hand, a state that relies most heavily for electricity on natural gas-fired power plants, nuclear 
power, and renewable energy will have an emissions goal based upon Building Blocks 2 (substitution of 
natural gas plant electricity generation for coal-fired power plant generation), 3 (nuclear and renewable 
energy) and 4 (demand-side energy efficiency programs). New Jersey, 44-percent reliant on natural gas, 
51-percent reliant on nuclear power, and 2-percent reliant on renewable energy, might be an example of 
this second type of state, as is Minnesota, which is 14-percent reliant on natural gas, 22-percent reliant on 
nuclear, and 18-percent reliant on renewable energy. In other words, the goals for individual states 
assume incremental improvements in already adopted policies, not radically different energy conservation 
and clean energy development policies. 
Does	the	Clean	Power	Plan	Respect	State	Autonomy	over	States’	Electricity	
Sectors?	
Again, under the proposed rule, the answer is unquestionably “yes.” 
First, the CPP takes into account state differences as a result of its use of the state-planning structure of 
§ 111(d). Each state is responsible for developing a plan for meeting its state-specific carbon dioxide 
emissions rate goal that it can tailor to meet its particular priorities and objectives. 
Second, a state is bound only by the state-specific emissions rate goal and not by the emission rate 
generated by each building block. This aspect of the CPP provides states with flexibility in how they meet 
their 2030 emissions rate goal. A state may choose to exceed the emissions rate calculated by the 
methodology for Building Block 1 (e.g., increases in the heat rate efficiency of the state’s coal generating 
plants), for example, but make up for that exceedance through a greater reliance upon low- and zero-
carbon (renewable energy) generating capacity and demand-side energy efficiency programs under 
Building Blocks 3 and 4. 
Does	the	Clean	Power	Plan	Allow	for	or	Encourage	State	Compliance	on	a	
Regional	Basis?	
Again, the answer is yes.  
Under the proposed rule, compliance on a regional basis is a key aspect of the flexibility EPA is providing 
to states when developing their § 111(d) plans. Regional compliance could facilitate cheaper compliance 
across the country.  
The theory behind regional compliance is simple: By expanding the territory from which emissions 
reductions can be made from a single state to a group of states, a regional approach will generate a greater 
number and variety of emissions reduction options and hence enable policymakers to comply with 
applicable emissions targets in a more efficient manner. Regional compliance may be facilitated through a 
cap-and-trade mechanism whereby policymakers apply a cap upon aggregate emissions from an entire 
region, but permit the reductions needed to meet the cap to be distributed in an efficient and equitable 
manner across the region.  
The regional compliance approach reflects the fact that electricity in the United States is generated and 
distributed on a regional basis. In addition, expanding the geographic size of balancing areas can allow a 
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greater percentage of intermittent power sources (e.g., wind and solar) due to increased flexibility to 
respond to renewable energy fluctuations. 
Finally, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), the cap and trade program being implemented 
by northeastern states to reduce emissions from the region’s electric power sector, demonstrates the 
viability of a regional approach to GHG reductions from the electricity sector. 
EPA’s proposed rule provides for incentives for states to comply on a regional basis. States that intend to 
comply on a regional basis are given an additional year to submit their compliance plans. Furthermore, all 
states are allowed to translate the EPA-provided rate-based emissions goal into a mass-based emissions 
goal. A regional cap and trade program will be easier to administer where states are subject to a mass-
based, as opposed to a rate-based, goal. See David Driesen’s article on the topic elsewhere in this report. 
Pros	and	Cons	of	the	Clean	Power	Plan’s	Cooperative	Federalism	Framework		
EPA’s approach to state implementation under the CPP has many pros and a few cons.  
The largest “pro” is that EPA provides a healthy dose of flexibility to the states by allowing each state to 
craft its own plan for complying with its federally-established emissions goal. This aspect of the CPP is a 
direct result of EPA’s use of § 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, which incorporates a cooperative federalism 
approach to compliance. EPA expands upon this traditional aspect of cooperative federalism by allowing 
and indeed encouraging, states to comply through the submission of regional plans forged through 
cooperative agreements with other states.272  
A second “pro” of EPA’s approach is that it works with states to “green” their electricity sectors and does 
not require that they perform the politically and sometimes technically difficult task of conforming their 
sectors to some ideal mix of low-carbon sources. EPA’s methodology for determining state emission 
goals recognizes and works with states’ very different starting points for carbon reductions from their 
electricity sectors. It does so by defining BSER as required improvements in different aspects of a state’s 
electricity sector corresponding to the four building blocks. Under EPA’s methodology, regardless of 
each state’s starting point — its mix of electric-generating resources or energy conservation measures — 
each state must improve its emissions (i.e., reach BSER for each building block). In constructing state 
2030 emission goals in this manner, EPA recognizes that states cannot re-do their electricity sectors 
overnight (this would be prohibited on operational and cost feasibility grounds), and yet EPA does not let 
states “off the hook.” Regardless of its starting point on the road to a low-carbon electricity sector, each 
state must do its part to reduce carbon emissions from their varied electricity sectors.  
A third “pro” is the manner in which EPA’s CPP will provide for federal enforcement of the states’ plans 
to reduce carbon emissions from their electricity sectors. Once state implementing plans are approved by 
EPA, these plans will be enforceable both as a matter of state and federal law. This provides a federal 
backstop to state climate-related policies that some states might be tempted for reasons of cost or politics 
to weaken or abandon. This federal backstop will also strengthen certain state policies by requiring states 
to attain a regional renewable energy target that constitutes the average of the 2020 target of the existing 
state-level renewable electricity standards within each region. 
A potential “con” of EPA’s cooperative federalism framework is the flipside of the “pros” set forth above 
— the manner in which the CPP asks for improvements from all states, whether or not they have already 
taken steps in the past to reduce carbon emissions from their electricity sectors. This “every state must do 
its part” approach arguably results in failing to reward states that made significant investments in de-
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carbonizing measures in the past while rewarding those states that put off such investments. 
Generalizations are tricky, however, and EPA has itself aptly warned against relying on the differences in 
state emission reduction percentages when judging the aggressiveness of state emission goals.273 More 
telling are the estimates of compliance costs across states. Yet current estimates of state compliance costs 
can vary tremendously, depending upon the assumptions made in the analysis.274  
It is doubtful that EPA’s CPP will run into legal hurdles based solely upon its incorporation of varying 
state emission goals. The courts have generally shown EPA ample deference in its policy decisions in the 
context of implementing a complex statutory scheme such as § 111(d) of the Clean Air Act. In addition, 
the recent case of EPA v. EME Homer City Generation275 indicates that the Supreme Court is willing to 
uphold EPA’s imposition of differing pollution reduction burdens upon states where the differences are 
integral to a comprehensive plan to address a multi-state environmental problem. In Homer, the Court 
upheld EPA’s strategy to address interstate air pollution in its “Transport rule,” the agency’s second 
attempt to address the complex and politically fraught issue of interstate air pollution. 
What	to	Watch	for	in	EPA’s	Final	Clean	Power	Plan	Rule	with	Respect	to	
Cooperative	Federalism	Issues	
From a cooperative federalism standpoint, EPA’s final release of the CPP rule should answer several key 
questions relative to § 111(d) of the Clean Air Act: 
1. Does EPA retain the same degree of flexibility to the states in developing their compliance plans? 
 
2. Does EPA retain the same incentives for states to cooperate with each other to develop and 
submit regional compliance plans? 
 
3. Does EPA keep the same building blocks as the proposed rule, or does it vary the blocks, and if 
so, how does this affect state compliance costs? 
 
4. Over the longer term, how do states intend to use the flexibility provided to them? Do states 
intend to make use of the option to develop and submit regional compliance plans?  
 
5. In the weeks and months following the release of EPA’s final rule, what response do the various 
states give to EPA’s final rule?  
Conclusions	
In its proposed CPP, EPA employs the cooperative federalism structure of § 111(d) of the Clean Air Act 
to establish performance standards for the best system of reduced carbon dioxide emissions from 
electricity generating sources. EPA’s standards are drawn from the states themselves, many of which have 
been active in reducing the emissions-intensity of their electricity sectors since the 1990s. Furthermore, 
EPA’s plan provides all states with flexibility in how they comply with the federal standards. This 
flexibility recognizes and works with states’ very different starting points for reducing carbon emissions 
from their electricity sectors. It also provides for states to comply through collaboration on a regional 
level, an option that may prove attractive to many states because it may provide additional flexibility in 
terms of compliance options and reduce concerns over electricity reliability. EPA’s CPP raises some 
questions concerning fairness if it turns out that states that invested heavily in lowering the carbon 
intensity of their electricity sectors bear the highest costs of the CPP going forward.   
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Mass‐based standards better reflect 
the available mechanisms for 
reducing power plant emissions and 
provide greater certainty that 
emissions will be reduced 
notwithstanding economic growth.  
A	Mass‐Based	Cap	for	Power	Plants	
By David M. Driesen 
 
The	Issue	of	the	Form	of	Limits	
 
One issue EPA confronts in its power plant rule concerns the form of emission limits — specifically the 
question of whether the rule’s limits should be expressed as a limit on the rate of emissions or as a limit 
on the mass of emissions. Although this issue might seem arcane, it will matter a great deal to the future 
of EPA efforts to address climate disruption. Mass-based standards better reflect the available 
mechanisms for reducing power plant emissions and provide greater certainty that emissions will be 
reduced notwithstanding economic growth.276 
 
In the past, EPA has often promulgated rate-based limits for emissions.277 For power plants, such 
emission limits often specify the maximum pounds of a pollutant emitted per million British thermal units 
(BTUs) of energy produced. This form of emission limit naturally fits regulations based on end-of-the-
pipe controls. In such a context, EPA could set standards by identifying the emissions rate that available 
end-of-the-pipe controls could achieve. Such controls would limit the rate of emissions, but the total mass 
of emissions would vary depending on the amount of 
electricity produced. 
 
A mass-based limit, by contrast, limits the tons of emissions 
emitted at a facility per year, not the rate of emissions per 
unit of production. The acid rain program, for example, 
employs mass-based limits on the tons of sulfur dioxide 
power plants may emit in a year. Although mass-based limits 
provide a hard target such that the total emissions do not 
vary with production rates, they prove quite flexible, because 
while all pollution control measures reduce the mass of emissions, only some reduce emission rates. For 
example, utility programs to enhance energy efficiency improvements in homes, offices, and factories 
(end-use efficiency) lower demand for electricity and therefore reduce the mass of emissions from power 
plants.278 End-use efficiency, however, does not reduce emission rates. Similarly, utility deployment and 
use of renewable energy sources, such as wind and solar energy, lower emissions by leading to reductions 
in electricity produced by coal-fired or natural gas-fired power plants. Hence, renewable energy reduces 
the mass of emissions from fossil fuel-fired plants, but does not reduce their emissions rate.279 
Accordingly, California, the northeastern states involved in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI), the European Union (EU), and many other countries have adopted programs that rely on mass-
based emission limits for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.  
 
EPA’s	Proposal	to	Allow	States	to	Choose	Between	Rate‐Based	and	Mass‐Based	
Limits	
 
EPA’s proposal puts forth a rate-based limit for power plants, sometimes called a carbon intensity limit, 
restricting the amount of carbon dioxide emitted per megawatt hour of electricity produced.280 EPA has 
proposed to offer states a choice between rate- and mass-based limits, inviting states wishing to use mass-
based limits to use an energy model to convert the rate-based standards into mass-based limits. 
Furthermore, it has proposed to allow states to change the form of the standard after writing its 
regulations when it comes time to comply. The proposal is not at all clear about how it would verify that 
power plants have met the rate-based standards. Indeed, EPA requested comment on the idea of assigning 
part of the compliance obligation for meeting state standards to states or other entities. 
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Yet nearly all of the emission reduction systems forming the basis for the rule (the building blocks) would 
reduce the mass of emissions. This is true even of measures that reduce the rate of emissions, such as heat 
rate improvements (improvement of power plant efficiency). For example, a coal-fired power plant emits 
about 2,000 pounds of carbon dioxide per megawatt hour of electricity. If a plant with this baseline 
emissions rate implements a heat rate improvement increasing its combustion efficiency by 5 percent, this 
would reduce the emissions rate to 1,900 pounds per megawatt hour of electricity generated (95 percent 
of 2,000 pounds). This would also reduce the mass of emissions from what it would otherwise be. If the 
plant generated 1,500 megawatt hours of electricity annually, it would, without a heat rate improvement, 
produce about 3 million pounds of carbon dioxide annually (1,500 X 2,000). If production remained 
constant and it made a 5 percent heat rate improvement, the mass of emissions would decrease from 3 
million pounds to 2.8 million pounds. If production did not remain constant, these numbers would 
change, but the heat rate improvement would still influence the mass of emissions. Because all emission 
reduction measures influence the mass of emissions, EPA recognizes that mass-based limits provide for 
greater simplicity in accounting for a variety of emission reduction strategies.281 
 
A reduction in the mass of utility emissions, however, does not produce a reduction in the emissions 
rate.282 In other words, the converse is not true. Suppose we deployed renewable energy, so that we only 
needed 1,000 megawatt hours from a coal-fired plant formerly producing 1,500 megawatts. Lowering 
electricity production at a coal-fired plant by a third (as in this example) would lower the mass of 
emissions at the coal-fired plant by about a third as well. But the emissions rate would not decrease; the 
amount of pollution per megawatt hour would remain constant.283  
 
The point that emission rate changes reduce the mass of emissions but that changes in the mass of 
emissions do not reduce the emissions rate may seem counterintuitive (since it is asymmetrical). But think 
about driving. If you drive a car getting 20 miles per gallon of gasoline to work every day and are sick for 
a month, you reduce the total amount of fuel consumed (the mass) because you are driving less. You do 
not change the rate of fuel consumption, which remains 20 miles per gallon. But if you tinkered with the 
engine and reduced the emissions rate, you would consume less gasoline.  
 
To arrive at its rate-based limits, EPA took into account the emission reductions possible through the 
measures included with its building blocks. EPA then employed equations that convert measures that 
reduce the mass of emissions at particular facilities into estimates of the changes in overall statewide 
emission rates.284 For example, shifting generation to natural gas might lower coal-fired production and 
increase gas-fired production, thereby changing the overall state emissions rate without changing the 
emissions rate at either facility. But energy efficiency measures would not lower emission rates at all, so 
EPA introduced a fudge factor to give states credits for this, creating a lower statewide emissions rate 
reflecting the potential for demand reduction through improved energy efficiency. Conversely, if EPA’s 
final rule were to employ a mass-based limit, it would have to estimate the effect of emission rate 
improvements (such as heat rate improvements) on the mass of emissions to construct the limits. But the 
mass-based limit would describe actual emission reductions that the technologies are expected to realize. 
 
The	Advantages	of	Mass‐Based	Limits	
 
Mass-based limits have distinct advantages over rate-based limits. Perhaps the most significant involves 
the ability of mass-based caps to reliably reduce emissions below current levels even when economic 
growth leads to production increases. This is especially important for regulation of carbon dioxide from 
power plants because carbon dioxide accumulates in the atmosphere and commits us to more future 
climate disruption. On the other hand, in the face of a recession, a rate-based limit would demand some 
improvement where a mass-based limit might not. But recessions have been less common historically 
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Rate‐based emissions trading 
programs have never worked 
properly, and California and the 
northeastern states’ programs rely 
heavily on mass‐based emissions 
trading to restrain power plant 
emissions. 
than periods of economic growth. Furthermore, a recession will usually cause emissions to decline even if 
power plants make no technological changes to reduce emissions.  
 
Mass-based limits also assign responsibility for reconciling environmental goals with economic growth to 
industry, rather than to understaffed and politically hampered regulatory agencies. This is especially 
important for a long-term and critical problem like climate disruption. If increased demand causes 
emissions to increase, as it will under rate-based limits, we will need more rules, which many state 
agencies have little capacity or will to produce. Mass-based limits can keep emissions below current 
baselines even if demand rises.  
 
Furthermore, if EPA chooses a rate-based limit in the final rule it may undermine the programs of the 
states leading the charge to reduce GHG emissions — all of which have relied primarily on mass-based 
limits. If the northeastern states and California run into opposition as they move forward with their 
programs in the future, an EPA rule offering rate-based 
limits may lead industries in these states to pressure them to 
convert mass-based programs to rate-based programs.  
 
Rate-based emissions trading programs have never worked 
properly, and California and the northeastern states’ 
programs rely heavily on mass-based emissions trading to 
restrain power plant emissions. One reason involves the 
difficulty of accounting for demand shifts under a rate-based 
standard. For example, suppose that a power plant emitting 3 
million pounds of pollution shuts down. If demand does not 
decline, however, this plant shutdown may cause another 
facility to increase generation, perhaps emitting an extra 3 million pounds of pollution. This means that 
net emissions have not changed. Yet, under the rate-based bubble programs that preceded the acid rain 
program, polluters would claim “phantom credits” for the shutdown facility’s emissions decrease without 
assuming any responsibility for the associated emissions increase at another facility. The net result in this 
example would be a three million pound increase in emissions above planned levels, for the operator 
purchasing phantom credits could increase emissions by 3 million pounds above required levels with 
these credits. A milder form of this loss of emission reductions could occur anytime a facility slowed 
production.  
 
A mass-based cap, however, eliminates the phantom credit problem. Under a mass-based program, the 
increased pollution associated with increasing production to make up for the shutdown facility’s output 
could violate the mass-based cap. Accordingly, an operator looking to increase production to meet unmet 
demand would have to employ additional controls to avoid the emissions increase or purchase credits 
from some other capped source making extra reductions to make up for the increase. A mass-based cap 
avoids a series of problems like this that can turn emissions trading into an exercise in gaming the system. 
 
Mass-based limits will also facilitate compliance and enforcement. Power plants’ compliance with mass-
based limits could be shown simply through measurements of power plant emissions.285 It is not at all 
clear how one could enforce individual facility compliance if states seek to comply with a rate-based limit 
partially or largely through measures that reduce the mass of emissions. 
 
Finally, the provision in the proposal allowing states to change a limit established in EPA-approved rules 
after the fact invites gaming. It would allow states to take advantage of vagaries in the modeling 
assumptions underlying the conversions to convert non-compliance with a planned limit into compliance 
with a laxer limit.286  
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EPA’s	Final	Rule	Should	Demand	Mass‐Based	Limits		
 
If EPA’s final rule requires mass-based limits from the states, that would constitute an important 
improvement on the proposal, especially if EPA strengthens the standards appropriately. Since 
compliance with a mass-based cap can be shown through each source meeting its mass-based cap, such a 
choice could facilitate a final rule that clearly regulates power plants, even if the power plants choose to 
rely on state renewables and energy efficiency programs instead of investing their funds in implementing 
these programs. This focus on power plant, rather than state, compliance would make the rule more likely 
to survive judicial review.  
 
If the final rule promulgates rate-based standards, states should convert the rate-based limits into mass-
based limits and stick with them to better ensure compliance and simplify enforcement. States will then 
be able to verify compliance by simply collecting already required reports on the mass of emissions from 
regulated facilities. Otherwise, they will have to employ complicated formulas to convert programmatic 
choices into estimates of virtual emission rates to show compliance and will have difficulty holding 
pollution sources accountable.  
 
But to make this work properly, EPA needs to change the conversion formula used to convert virtual 
emission rates into real mass-based limits. Currently the formula is based on projections of business-as-
usual emissions, which have usually proven inaccurate.287 EPA should instead base conversion on the 
assumption that recent decoupling of economic growth and increased energy consumption will continue 
or be enhanced by its rule.  
  
A choice of a mass-based limit does not mean that states must use a cap-and-trade approach. A mass-
based limit could be met through mass-based source-specific limits, energy efficiency programs, 
renewable energy programs and other programs that reduce the mass of emissions at utilities.288  
 
If EPA does choose a mass-based limit, its opponents may accuse it of implementing the failed Waxman-
Markey bill through the back door regardless of the form of emission limits. EPA is not implementing 
Waxman-Markey through the back door. It acts pursuant to the CAA, regulates industry by industry, will 
not auction off allowances, does not provide for long-term large scale reductions, and will not require a 
cap-and-trade approach as Waxman-Markey would have.  
 
Conclusion	
 
Climate disruption is an urgent problem. It is important in this context not to undo a major advance that 
has occurred in the world of climate regulation — the use of mass-based caps. 
 
Recommendation	
 EPA’s final rule should establish mass-based caps. If it does not, states should establish mass-
based caps in their plans and stick with them. 
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The	Clean	Power	Plan	and	Environmental	Justice	
By Alice Kaswan 
Introduction	
Although the location of carbon emissions is largely irrelevant to their environmental impacts, the Clean 
Power Plan (CPP) and state implementation plans (SIPs) will have significant ancillary benefits for 
associated co-pollutant emissions. This section discusses the proposed CPP’s generally positive impact on 
aggregate co-pollutant emissions, noting the importance of a system-wide approach and sufficiently 
stringent targets. In addition, it discusses and responds to the environmental justice critique of cap-and-
trade programs, noting that cap-and-trade under the CPP might be less troubling than expected because it 
avoids some of the downsides associated with other trading programs. The section concludes by 
identifying key issues to watch for in the final rule: the stringency of EPA’s state targets, and whether 
EPA will require states to engage in environmental justice analysis. It also emphasizes that, whatever 
EPA promulgates in the final rule, the states are likely to be the key players in determining the CPP’s 
environmental justice implications. States should engage in comprehensive energy planning that retires 
the most harmful plants, encourages no-emission alternatives like renewables and energy efficiency, and 
addresses the social justice impacts of higher energy prices by helping low-income communities invest in 
energy efficiency and distributed generation renewables.  
The	Link	Between	GHG	Reductions	and	Co‐pollutant	Emissions	
EPA’s CPP will have major impacts on a range of health-threatening co-pollutants that inevitably 
accompany GHG emissions, including particulates, sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, as well as toxics like 
mercury.289 Coal-fired power plants generate more than half of the nation’s sulfur dioxide emissions and 
substantial nitrogen oxide emissions. The sulfur and nitrogen oxide emissions contribute to the formation 
of fine particulates, which cause respiratory and cardiopulmonary distress and have been linked to 
premature death. Nitrogen oxide emissions also contribute to the formation of ozone, causing smog, 
which leads to a wide range of adverse health effects. Coal-fired power plants are the primary domestic 
source of mercury pollution.  
Although other CAA programs address these pollutants, many regions remain plagued by significant and 
persistent air quality problems. As discussed further below, EPA and other analysts predict that the CPP, 
and states’ implementation of the CPP, will provide ancillary co-pollutant benefits that go beyond 
existing regulatory requirements. Multi-benefits approaches that consider GHG reductions, co-pollutants, 
as well as other variables can capture important synergies and opportunities, and provide greater overall 
benefits. 
In considering co-pollutant impacts, both aggregate and distributional effects matter. Aggregate impacts 
reflect the degree to which the CPP and its implementation options maximize aggregate co-pollutant 
reductions by sparking a transition from a dirtier to a cleaner energy system. Distributional impacts 
determine the degree to which the CPP and its implementation options maximize reductions where they 
are needed most: in the areas experiencing the highest pollution levels and those that are otherwise most 
vulnerable to pollution’s effects. 
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Although EPA’s systemwide 
approach was based upon a wide 
range of carbon reduction 
mechanisms that allowed EPA to 
establish more stringent targets, it 
is unclear whether the targets EPA 
proposed in the draft CPP are 
stringent enough to accomplish the 
degree of transformation that is 
both possible and necessary. One 
concern is that an insufficiently 
stringent target will incentivize a 
transition to natural gas rather 
than no‐carbon alternatives. 
Aggregate	Co‐Pollutant	Benefits	
The Aggregate Benefits of a Systemwide Approach 
The CPP’s use of a system-wide approach that encompasses measures “outside the fenceline” is critical to 
maximizing aggregate GHG and co-pollutant benefits. Had EPA focused solely on measures that existing 
power plants could implement on site, EPA would likely have achieved only the 6-percent reduction in 
GHG and associated co-pollutant emissions considered achievable under building block 1.290 By 
encouraging a shift from coal to natural gas under building block 2, the CPP not only reduces GHG 
emissions, but also reduces aggregate co-pollutant emissions because coal-fired power plants generate 
significantly higher levels of both GHGs and co-pollutants per unit of energy than natural gas. Similarly, 
building blocks 3 and 4 anticipate increased use of no-emission renewable energy and energy efficiency, 
reducing overall pollution from coal-fired power.  
EPA has emphasized the anticipated aggregate co-
pollutant reduction benefits predicted under the CPP. 
Although the CPP’s flexibility makes it difficult to 
predict precise co-pollutant benefits, EPA has identified 
the possible range, which reveals that co-pollutant 
benefits from the CPP comprise $23 to $54 billion by 
2030, above and beyond an anticipated $30 billion in 
climate benefits.291 These benefits are all in addition to 
the benefits already anticipated from a range of recently 
adopted co-pollutant controls, including the Cross-State 
Air Pollution Rule and the Mercury Air Toxics 
Standard.292 The actual benefits are likely higher; EPA 
noted that, for co-pollutants, it quantified only the 
particulate and ozone benefits, and did not include the 
benefits of reductions in toxics or acid rain.293  
Co-pollutant studies by independent sources have 
confirmed the co-pollutant benefits of a system-wide 
approach. Although they did not analyze the CPP itself, 
researchers from Harvard and other institutions analyzed a similar flexible approach and assumed 
aggressive efforts to increase consumer energy efficiency. Their study demonstrated significant 
reductions in co-pollutants and improvements in particulate and ozone pollution.294 The Clean Air Task 
Force studied the co-pollutant consequences of an approach that achieved most reductions by shifting 
from coal to natural gas, and likewise found significant reductions in co-pollutants.295 
Questions about Stringency 
Due to the strong correlation between GHG and co-pollutant emissions, the more stringent the GHG 
target, the greater the co-pollutant reduction benefits. Stringency is essential to transforming the energy 
sector to a low-carbon, and low-co-pollutant, future. 
Although EPA’s systemwide approach was based upon a wide range of mechanisms for reducing power 
plant emissions and therefore allowed EPA to establish more stringent targets, it is unclear whether the 
targets EPA proposed in the draft CPP are stringent enough to accomplish the degree of transformation 
that is both possible and necessary. One concern is that an insufficiently stringent target will incentivize 
states to reduce coal-fired power plant emissions by transitioning to natural gas rather than no-carbon 
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alternatives. Even though the construction of new natural gas plants was not included in calculating the 
targets, states have the flexibility to meet their targets by whatever means they choose, including retiring 
coal plants and building new natural gas capacity. New natural gas plants would considerably lower GHG 
and co-pollutant emissions, but not as much as investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency. 
As Joseph P. Tomain discusses in his contribution on the CPP’s role in transitioning to clean energy, 
greater reliance on natural gas would thus perpetuate reliance on fossil fuels with its associated emissions, 
present new distributional emissions concerns where new plants are built, and present the range of 
environmental and public health concerns associated with high-volume hydraulic fracturing, better known 
as “fracking.” 
Another important question is whether EPA was stringent enough within the building blocks. EPA has 
made clear that the targets are not based on each state doing the maximum possible under each building 
block. While that provides states with some needed flexibility in case of unexpected implementation 
hurdles, the question is whether EPA has expected enough — whether states could accomplish a larger 
percentage of the actions that EPA has identified as achievable. In addition, some commentators have 
argued that EPA has underestimated achievable emissions within certain building blocks. For example, 
the Union of Concerned Scientists has argued that EPA underestimated renewable energy sources and 
opportunities for achieving greater end-use energy efficiency. Also, in calculating targets, EPA indicated 
that it did not include numerous measures that could reduce emissions, like coal plants co-firing with 
natural gas, or improvements to transmission grids to reduce electricity leakage.  
Cap‐and‐Trade	versus	Direct	Regulation:	Aggregate	and	Distributional	Results	
The Environmental Justice Critique of Cap‐and‐Trade 
The CPP gives states the option of meeting their targets through a state or regional cap-and-trade 
program. Environmental justice advocates have had longstanding concerns about the distributional 
consequences of cap-and-trade. Under that approach, a state 
would translate the EPA-set emissions rate targets into an 
equivalent mass-based cap on overall emissions from 
covered facilities, and then distribute allowances to covered 
facilities or have them purchase allowances at an allowance 
auction. If allowances were distributed for free, then most 
facilities would have fewer allowances than existing 
emissions. They would then have three options: (1) reduce 
emissions to meet the number of allowances they received; 
(2) reduce emissions by more than necessary and sell the 
excess allowances; or (3) buy allowances to cover their 
existing emissions and, potentially, to cover increased 
emissions. If allowances were sold at an auction, then 
facilities would buy needed allowances based on their 
emissions choices. 
Thus, under cap-and-trade, power plants could purchase 
allowances rather than improving operations, thus failing to 
achieve co-pollutant reductions and, potentially, increasing 
emissions. If the facilities purchasing extra allowances are 
located in areas that are already heavily polluted, a cap-and-
trade approach will fail to distribute reductions to the areas 
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that need them most. While it is possible that trades could lead to positive distributional consequences, 
lowering pollution where reductions are most needed, the reverse is also possible: trades could 
concentrate pollution — co-pollutants, in particular — in areas and communities already most heavily 
burdened by pollution. Due in part to these distributional concerns, some environmental justice advocates 
have expressed concern about states implementing the CPP through cap-and-trade programs. 
The	Complicated	Environmental	Justice	Story	
It is clear that cap-and-trade programs do not maximize distributional benefits. But it is important to note 
a couple of reasons why that may be less troubling in this context than in others. First, in the energy 
sector, a trading program could, at least in general terms, have more positive distributional tendencies 
than in more comprehensive cap-and-trade programs. Second, the CPP’s treatment of offsets is likely to 
preserve the co-pollutant benefits of in-sector reductions. And third, it’s all relative: EPA’s most likely 
regulatory alternatives may not provide superior distributional results. I analyze each of these in turn. 
Cap‐and‐trade could create incentives for reductions from the most‐polluting sources 
In the energy sector, coal-fired power has the highest GHG intensity and the highest co-pollutant 
intensity. So, if the carbon price generated by a cap-and-trade program is high enough, it will most 
strongly discourage the use of more-polluting coal-fired power and encourage less-polluting alternatives, 
including natural gas, renewables, and demand-side efficiency. That does not mean that reductions will 
necessarily occur where they are most needed or that all polluting facilities will reduce emissions, but it 
does increase the likelihood that GHG reductions will come from the most co-pollutant-intensive sources. 
The extent of the positive effect will, however, depend on two factors. First, the cap-and-trade program 
must be stringent enough to create an effective price signal. Programs to date have often suffered from 
“lax caps,” and, as a consequence, emissions prices, and the incentive to reduce emissions from the most 
polluting sources, have been low. Second, the degree to which a robust price signal will generate 
reductions from the most polluting facilities depends to some degree on whether the state’s utility 
regulations dampen utility sensitivity to price signals. In states that do not have competitive rates and in 
which utilities can pass costs through to consumers, high allowance prices will be less effective at 
reducing high-carbon sources.296 
Precluding offsets increases energy sector co‐pollutant reductions 
As authorized under the CPP, cap-and-trade will also avoid one of the common environmental justice 
critiques of GHG cap-and-trade programs to date: the use of offsets. The CPP does not allow states to 
meet their targets through the use of offsets; instead, the states must show that they have achieved actual 
reductions in energy sector emissions.297 By not allowing offsets to count toward compliance with CPP 
targets, the CPP will drive actual changes in the electricity sector, and, as such, will likely increase 
aggregate co-pollutant benefits. Offsets may have other salutary co-benefits, like forest preservation, but 
they nonetheless detract from the co-pollutant benefits associated with in-sector GHG reductions. (See 
also Victor Flatt’s discussion of offsets to show compliance under the CPP.) 
Cap‐and‐trade, compared to what?  
While cap-and-trade under the CPP is likely to drive reductions from the most co-pollutant intensive 
energy sources (coal-fired power) and will avoid diluting co-pollutant benefits through the use of offsets, 
neither of these features addresses a key critique of cap-and-trade: its distributional impacts. The question, 
then, is whether EPA could develop emission guidelines with better distributional consequences. Given 
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EPA’s mandate to focus on the best “system” of emission reduction and the role of the states in 
developing actual implementation plans, it is difficult to envision alternatives with better distributional 
results. EPA is highly unlikely to directly require states to close their most polluting facilities and invest 
in EE and RE.  
One plausible option — setting minimum emission-rate standards for all coal-fired power plants — might 
appear to offer better distributional results. Some might argue that, instead of simply giving coal-fired 
facilities the option of adopting efficiency improvements, EPA should require them. Such a requirement 
might be on its own (if EPA abandons its “beyond the fenceline” approach) or might be combined with 
the other building blocks, but as a mandatory component. Although it looks like consistent emission-rate 
standards would have more even and widespread distributional results than cap-and-trade, this approach 
would also fail to optimize distributional results.  
First, an emission-rate standard would not lead to reductions at all plants. The existing efficiency of coal-
fired power plants varies greatly. Only facilities below the standard would reduce emissions. Facilities 
that already meet the efficiency standard would not.298 
Second, emission-rate standards do not prevent increases in absolute emissions, they control only the 
emissions rate. In the interconnected energy system, major shifts in production from one facility to 
another are possible, and could affect absolute emissions even if emission rates are improved. At least two 
factors could lead some facilities to increase local emissions. One is facility retirements: analysts predict 
that the least efficient facilities will retire rather than make efficiency improvements. To make up for the 
loss of supply, other power plants could operate at a higher capacity, creating localized emissions 
increases. The plants increasing operation might have lower emission rates than the retiring plants 
(particularly if coal-fired power plants retire and natural gas plants ramp up), improving aggregate 
pollution levels. Nonetheless, from a distributional perspective, localized emissions from the plants 
increasing operations would increase. 
Another factor that could lead to increased emissions notwithstanding minimum emission-rate standards 
is a predicted “rebound” effect. If coal-fired power plants make efficiency improvements rather than 
retire, then they may operate the plants more intensively, leading to an increase in localized emissions. In 
a study of co-pollutant impacts associated with GHG controls on the energy sector, Schwartz et al., 
predict that, if EPA were to impose only emission-rate standards and no other flexible options, the 
rebound effect could cause SO2 emissions to increase overall. Thus, while cap-and-trade does not ensure 
positive distributional results, a primary alternative, traditional source-specific emission-rate 
requirements, will not do so either. 
What	to	Look	for	in	the	Clean	Power	Plan:	The	Federal	Role		
Although it would be difficult for EPA to directly control distributional results, a key issue in assessing 
the final rule will be whether EPA maximized aggregate co-pollutant benefits by setting sufficiently 
stringent state targets. Stringent targets will induce transformative change by disincentivizing coal-fired 
power. Moreover, stringent targets would increase the relative attractiveness of zero-emission options 
relative to natural gas. Stringent targets are particularly important to the effectiveness of cap-and-trade 
programs because low allowance prices encourage utilities to continue “business as usual” while strict 
targets are likely to lead to stringent caps that generate a more effective price signal to induce a deeper 
clean energy transition. While it is difficult to assess the adequacy of EPA’s state targets without 
analyzing each state’s calculation in detail, any significant backtracking in the final rule would present 
cause for concern. 
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The second key issue to watch for in the final rule is procedural: whether, as recommended by numerous 
environmental justice groups, EPA will require states to analyze the environmental justice implications of 
their SIPs.299 As discussed further below, the critical planning decisions must be made at the state level. A 
federal requirement to consider environmental justice implications would make the opportunities and 
tradeoffs of states’ implementation choices more transparent, and facilitate public opportunities to 
influence and respond to state planning efforts.  
What	the	States	Can	Do	to	Further	Environmental	Justice	
Ultimately, however, the final rule is likely to continue to cede critical decision-making authority to the 
states, and the states will be the central arena for maximizing the environmental justice benefits of CPP 
implementation. Environmental justice groups and their allies should be poised to focus on state 
implementation planning, including the following central themes: 
First, although cap-and-trade programs may not be as problematic under the CPP, the use of a cap-and-
trade program is not a substitute for responsible and comprehensive state planning. Some cap-and-trade 
advocates have suggested that, under cap-and-trade, the government’s role should be limited to setting the 
cap and enforcement, and that all other decisions about how to meet the cap should be left to the free 
market. Industry knows best, the argument goes, and industry is more likely to innovate when given 
unfettered flexibility.  
However, industry choices are often dictated by short-term market circumstances. State agencies are 
better positioned to consider long-term needs and strategies. While cap-and-trade can create positive price 
signals and allow some room for flexibility, a state should not give up its central governing functions, and 
should nest a cap-and-trade program within a more comprehensive energy policy that includes a range of 
complementary policies that shape utility choices in positive directions.  
For example, comprehensive state planning could encourage the retirement of the most polluting facilities 
in the most vulnerable locations. Although neither a rate-based emissions standard nor a cap-and-trade 
program would directly require the closure of the most polluting facilities in the most vulnerable 
locations, state public utility commissions and environmental agencies can work with their utilities to 
develop long-term plans that encourage reductions from the most polluting sources.  
In addition, although unfettered market forces and the dynamics of the energy industry might induce 
utilities to simply build new natural gas plants, states could steer investments in more positive long-term 
directions. They could develop policies, like renewable portfolio standards or energy efficiency standards 
for buildings, that steer investments away from a short-term reliance on natural gas toward non-fossil fuel 
alternatives that pave the way for a more sustainable future and reduce co-pollutants. 
In addition, advocates can encourage states to address the potential adverse impacts of a robust carbon 
price signal: higher energy prices, which are likely to affect the poor the most. One mechanism for 
ameliorating impacts on the poor is to use revenue from the sale of emissions allowances to address 
regressive impacts. Ideally, revenue could be used to help low income residents and businesses invest in 
energy efficiency and distributed renewable energy, measures that reduce carbon and energy bills, but that 
are often beyond the means of those with modest incomes. Providing funds would thus serve two salutary 
purposes: (1) provide low-income residents with access to energy-saving or alternative energy generating 
options; and (2) reduce the need for more expensive energy, ameliorating the impact of higher energy 
prices. For example, California has legislation that requires the state to devote 25 percent of auction 
revenue to energy-related investments in the state’s most disadvantaged vulnerable communities.300 
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Conclusion	
The CPP has the potential not only to reduce carbon emissions, but to reduce persistent co-pollutant 
pollution. States, in their implementation plans, have the capacity to initiate fundamental changes to the 
energy sector that maximize climate and public health benefits.  
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decrease in sulfur dioxide emissions, a 22 percent decrease in nitrogen oxide emissions, and a 27 percent decrease in mercury 
emissions, all beyond existing controls), available at http://www.chgeharvard.org/sites/default/files/userfiles2/Health%20Co‐
Benefits%20of%20Carbon%20Standards.pdf. 
295 Clean Air Task Force, supra note 289, at 25 (predicting reductions of 450,000 tons in annual sulfur dioxide and 400,000 tons 
in annual nitrogen oxide emissions by 2020, all in addition to existing requirements). 
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